The effects of product popularity on consumer decisions by Ha, Younhee
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2014 Younhee Ha 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF PRODUCT POPULARITY ON CONSUMER DECISIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
 
YOUNHEE HA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration 
in the Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
 
 
Doctoral Committee: 
 
Associate Professor Tiffany B. White, Chair & Co-director of Research 
Professor Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Co-director of Research 
Professor Madhu Viswanathan  
Professor Sharon Shavitt 
  
 
 
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Previous research suggests that consumers tend to use indications of products’ popularity 
to a greater extent when high demands are placed on their cognitive resources such as when 
decision uncertainty is high and the amount of information presented is large.  In this case, 
products’ popularity is likely to override the effect of specific attribute descriptions. In some 
cases, however, indications of others’ product preferences can sensitize consumers to a 
discrepancy between their general knowledge about a product category and their knowledge 
about the specific products they are evaluating. In my thesis, I identified conditions in which this 
is the case.  
I propose that product popularity makes knowledgeable consumers aware of a 
“knowledge gap,” which increases their curiosity about the uncertain product assortment. 
Consequently, they think about the products’ attributes in an attempt to understand others’ 
reactions to the assortment. As a result, the attribute information can have greater influence on 
their judgments than it would have if popularity information were not presented. Three studies 
provide evidence to corroborate this expectation. Furthermore, the results show that consumers’ 
tendency to deliberate on product attribution is stronger when (a) consumers perceive their 
general product knowledge to be high and (b) making decisions is cognitively demanding.  
 
 
  
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my parents, Daehyeong, Sophia, and Matthew 
  
 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................. 5 
2.1 General Effects of Product Popularity .................................................................. 5 
2.2 Theoretical Explanation ........................................................................................ 8 
2.2.1 Social desirability motives .............................................................................. 9 
2.2.2 Informational motives ................................................................................... 11 
2.2.3 Other possible mechanisms ........................................................................... 12 
2.2.4 Summary ....................................................................................................... 12 
2.3 Impact of Product Popularity in Information Processing .................................... 13 
2.3.1   Dual process model: The elaboration likelihood and heuristic-systematic 
models ................................................................................................................................... 13 
2.3.2 Situational factors: High decision uncertainty .............................................. 16 
2.3.3 Individual factors: The effect of consumer product knowledge on information 
processing strategy ................................................................................................................ 17 
2.3.4 The role of consumer knowledge on the effect of product popularity on 
attribute information processing ........................................................................................... 19 
2.3.5 Summary and discussion ............................................................................... 21 
   
 
 
v 
 
CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT ........................................................... 23 
3.1 Epistemic Curiosity ............................................................................................. 23 
3.1.1 General effect of epistemic curiosity ............................................................ 24 
3.1.2 The effects of epistemic curiosity on the impact of product popularity ........ 26 
3.1.3 Epistemic curiosity and consumer knowledge .............................................. 27 
3.1.4 Epistemic curiosity and size of assortment ................................................... 28 
3.2 Summary and Hypotheses ................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER 4 EXPERIMENTS ......................................................................................... 32 
4.1. Experiment 1- The effect of product popularity on decision outcome ............ 32 
4.1.1 Operationalization of key variables .............................................................. 32 
4.1.2 Methods ......................................................................................................... 37 
4.1.3 Results ........................................................................................................... 39 
4.1.4 Discussion ..................................................................................................... 43 
4.2 Experiment 2- The role of product knowledge in decision outcomes ................. 44 
4.2.1 Methods ......................................................................................................... 44 
4.2.2 Results ........................................................................................................... 47 
4.2.3 Discussion ..................................................................................................... 52 
4.3 Experiment 3- The effect of product popularity on attribute deliberation .......... 52 
4.3.1 Methods ......................................................................................................... 53 
4.3.2 Results ........................................................................................................... 56 
 
 
vi 
 
4.3.3 Discussion ..................................................................................................... 58 
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION........................................................................................... 59 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 66 
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................. 80 
APPENDIX A: MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 1 ........................................ 80 
APPENDIX B: MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 2 ........................................ 81 
APPENDIX C: MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 3 ........................................ 82 
APPENDIX D: THE SCALES OF EPISTEMIC CURIOSITY USED IN 
EXPERIMENT 2 ...................................................................................................................... 83 
APPENDIX E: KNOWLEDGE PERCEPTION MANIPULATION USED IN 
EXPERIMENT 3 ...................................................................................................................... 84 
APPENDIX F: SUMMARY OF RELEVANT RESEARCH ON EFFECTS OF 
PRODUCT POPULARITY ...................................................................................................... 85 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
  
Information about a product’s popularity is based on a consensus among previous 
consumers, indicating which option is most desirable among those available. Popularity can be 
inferred from the frequency of purchases (e.g., Cai, Chen, & Fang, 2009), the number of 
downloads (e.g., Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006; Salganik & Watts, 2008) or the number of 
clicks on specific options on a website (e.g., Tucker & Zhang, 2011).  
This type of information is a major component of many promotions and advertisements, 
from The New York Times’ best-seller list to weekly box office rankings for movies to the list of 
top songs in the iTunes store. Furthermore, its usage extends beyond commercial goods or 
services to digital content. For example, The New York Times and Yahoo list the most-viewed 
articles and their top 10 user searches on their webpages, informing visitors what others liked.  
This frequent use of popularity information may reflect the common belief that this 
information has a positive impact on consumer decisions. Research in many areas, ranging from 
economics to psychology to marketing (Cai et al., 2009; Goldstein, Cialdini, & Griskevicius, 
2008; Mackie, 1987; Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik & Watts, 2008; Tucker & Zhang, 2011), has 
consistently confirmed that the presence of product popularity information tends to make 
consumers lean toward more popular options. For example, adding popularity information 
among options leads to greater sales (Cai et al., 2009), directs prosocial behaviors (Goldstein et 
al., 2008), and leads to an increased number of downloads of an initially less preferred product 
(Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik & Watts, 2008) than does excluding this information.  
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The impact of product popularity on consumer decisions tends to be contingent on 
situational and individual factors. In particular, the influence of product popularity information 
often depends on decision uncertainty and consumers’ product knowledge. In general, the effect 
of others’ opinions is likely to increase with factors related to decision uncertainty (Gino & 
Moore, 2007; Sasaki, Becker, Janssen, & Neel, 2011). For example, when other goal-relevant 
information is either unavailable or difficult to process, a product’s popularity increases its 
impact on decisions as a heuristic basis for judgment (Chaiken, 1980; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 
1997; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991; Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). 
However, even when decision uncertainty is high, the influence of popularity information 
appears to depend on consumers’ product knowledge. On the one hand, consumers with limited 
product knowledge tend to place greater emphasis on others’ opinions than attribute information 
(Brucks, 1985) and are more likely to adopt the majority’s opinion on an issue rather than more 
issue-relevant material (Mackie, 1987; Sasaki et al., 2011). On the other hand, knowledgeable 
consumers are believed to know well about a specific product category in general and often to 
have well-defined preferences (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987; Mehta, Hoegg, & Chakravarti, 2011; 
Nam, Wang, & Lee, 2012; Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991; Wood, Kallgren, & Preisler, 1985). As 
a result, they are often more likely to ignore product popularity and might even dispute its 
implications (Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 2004; Goodman, Broniarczyk, Griffin, & McAlister, 
2013; Yaniv, 2004).  
These considerations therefore suggest that when uncertainty is high, consumers with 
limited product knowledge rely more on product popularity information as a mental shortcut to 
reduce their decision effort, whereas knowledgeable consumers do not. This conclusion assumes, 
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however, that consumers with high product category knowledge also know enough about the 
particular options in a product assortment to evaluate them easily.  
In reality, however, consumers often feel uncertain about a particular product assortment 
even if they possess substantial knowledge about the product category in general. For example, a 
typical supermarket might contain 275 types of cereal and 285 varieties of cookies (Botti & 
Iyengar, 2006) because manufacturers such as Kellogg and Procter & Gamble keep updating the 
products they manufacture.  Making the situation more complicated, retailers often introduce 
their own brands. As a result, although consumers may feel confident in their knowledge about a 
type of product category, they might still lack knowledge about a particular set of products of 
that type. Previous research has not fully examined the impact of product popularity on 
consumers’ decision processes when this gap in their knowledge exists. 
In this thesis, I investigate the nature of the impact of product popularity in this particular 
context. I propose that product popularity information often sensitizes knowledgeable consumers 
to a discrepancy between their general knowledge about a product category and their knowledge 
about the particular products in an assortment that others appear to know better. With three 
experiments, I find that consumers’ awareness of this knowledge increases their epistemic 
curiosity and consequently their attention to attribute information that might explain others’ 
preferences. 
I review relevant research and theory in Chapter 2. Then, in Chapter 3, I propose a 
theoretical framework to explain a situation that occurs often but has been neglected in the 
existing research. Chapter 4 describes the studies that I have conducted to examine the effect of 
product popularity described earlier. The first study explores the influence of product popularity 
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on attribute deliberation. I find that when consumers choose an option from among unfamiliar 
ones, they engage in more deliberative processing in the presence than in the absence of 
popularity cues, leading to stronger purchase intention.  Furthermore, this effect is more evident 
when the choice set size is large. In the next study, I obtained evidence that popularity cues have 
different effects on knowledgeable versus unknowledgeable participants’ attention to product 
attribute information and that this attention is mediated by the effect of popularity cues on 
epistemic curiosity.   
The last study provides direct evidence of the increased effect of popularity information 
on knowledgeable consumers’ use of product attribute information. Specifically, I found that 
product popularity increases the impact of the attributes’ favorableness on knowledgeable 
consumers’ judgments by motivating them to deliberate on product attribute information. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
In this chapter, I discuss the existing literature on the effect of product popularity on 
consumer judgments. In addition, situational and individual factors that modify this impact are 
reviewed.  
 
2.1 General Effects of Product Popularity 
 
A rich body of research has emphasized that information about a product’s popularity has 
a significant effect on consumer behaviors and evaluations (Cai et al., 2009; Carare, 2012; 
Goldstein et al., 2008; Hanson & Putler, 1996; Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik & Watts, 2008; 
Tucker & Zhang, 2011). This stream of research has consistently shown that consumers tend to 
go along with the majority (i.e., to choose more popular options).  The result of this effect on 
consumer behaviors is discussed below and summarized in Appendix F. 
Popularity information can reinforce a product’s existing popularity by encouraging 
consumers to flock to greatly preferred options (Cai et al., 2009; Carare, 2012; Hanson & Putler, 
1996; Huang & Chen, 2006). In a field experiment, for example, Cai et al. (2009) found that 
table cards naming the five most popular items in a restaurant boosted the number of orders of 
these items by as much as 20%.  Similarly, Hung and Chen (2006) show that a greater sales 
volume leads to a higher preference for an option when other related information does not 
discriminate among the alternatives. In particular, participants chose between two travel books 
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that were similar in publisher and price but differed in terms of sales volume. In one condition, 
the sales volume of one book was four times greater than the other and in the other, it was only 
slightly greater. More participants chose the first book when the difference between the sales 
volumes of the two books was large than when it was small.  Furthermore, people are willing to 
pay more for the more popular items. Carare (2012) show that consumers are willing to pay 
about $4.50 more for top-ranked mobile applications than for the same applications presented 
without ranking information.  
The power of product popularity is evident even if the information is experimentally 
manipulated.  Hanson and Putler (1996) showed that manipulating perceptions of the number of 
other users who had previously downloaded two target files influenced future sales levels. 
Although the two target options were essentially identical in their observed features (such as 
function, file size, level of informational detail, etc.), they found that the options that were 
ostensibly most popular were accessed 50% more often than control options. 
 Similarly, options that are initially less preferred by the majority can become mainstream 
if they look popular (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik & Watts, 2008; Tucker & Zhang, 2011). In a 
field study by Salganik and Watts (2008), participants first listened to 48 previously unknown 
songs from unknown bands and then decided which of these songs to download. Later, a separate 
set of participants listened to and downloaded the same list of songs having received altered 
information about the number of downloads of each song by the first subject group. This 
information was opposite from the actual number of downloads; that is, the least popular song in 
the previous session was described most popular and the most popular song was described as 
least popular. After presenting this false popularity, the initially least popular song became the 
most popular (i.e., it was downloaded by the largest number of participants).  
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In some cases, behavior can be influenced to a greater extent by popularity information 
than by rational reasons for engaging in it. In a field experiment, Goldstein et al. (2008) 
presented two different messages urging hotel guests’ participation in a towel reuse program. 
Each message contained the same information about the benefits of participating in the program 
(e.g., it would save the environment 72,000 gallons of water). However, one appeal began with 
“HELP SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT,” whereas the other began with “JOIN YOUR FELLOW 
GUESTS IN HELPING TO SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT” and stated that 75% of the hotel’s 
guests participated in the towel reuse program. The towel reuse rate was greater in the social (the 
latter) message than in the standard environmental message condition (44% vs. 35%, 
respectively). 
Even though the standard message emphasized the importance of the towel reuse 
program and its impact on the environment, the social message led to greater participation in the 
program. In other words, information about the majority’s choice had a greater effect on 
participants’ behavior than did an appeal that conveyed the rational importance of these changes 
for the environment. (For other indications that people’s behavior is affected more strongly by 
others’ actions than by persuasive appeals that stress the benefits of the behavior, see Cialdini, 
2012.)  
In sum, these studies indicate that popularity information is powerful enough to direct 
consumers’ evaluation and behavior: it can help to keep currently popular options popular in the 
future, regardless of the actual quality of those options. Also, it can boost behaviors that would 
not occur without knowledge of the high frequency of those behaviors in the past. 
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2.2  Theoretical Explanation 
 
As reviewed in the earlier section, research in social psychology (Asch, 1956; Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) and economics (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1992) provides countless evidence of conformity in individuals’ 
judgments. In Asch’s famous line judgment experiment (1956), for example, participants who 
were exposed to the majority’s obviously incorrect judgment of line length echoed the majority’s 
judgment. Similarly, with his mathematical model, Banerjee (1992) shows that after observing 
how other have behaved, decision makers tend to do what others have done rather than using the 
available information. In other words, people often conform to the majority’s behavior and 
beliefs.   
Why do people choose the options that are most popular?  People are inclined to follow 
others’ opinions for at least two reasons: individuals may adopt the observed choices of others in 
order to obtain others’ approval or understand an unfamiliar situation and behave correctly. 
Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) indicate that these two motives are interrelated and often difficult 
to disentangle theoretically as well as empirically (David & Turner, 2001).1. However, one of 
these motives can drive individuals’ action more strongly depending on which goal is more 
salient at the time of the decision. When a decision is susceptible to others’ judgment, for 
example, individuals care more about socially desirable options. 
                                                      
1 For a detailed discussion about the differences between two motives for social influence, see Cialdini, 2012. 
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2.2.1 Social desirability motives 
Individuals may interpret the majority’s opinion as an indication of the product’s social 
desirability (i.e., what products most others consider appropriate) (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 
1990; Venkatesan, 1966). This normative influence may be more closely related to social and 
cultural factors than informational influence. 
Social factors. Research has shown that people tend to follow what other people normally 
do in a certain situation, especially when they notice a group norm. In an experiment by 
Venkatesan (1966), participants along with three confederates were asked to determine which of 
three dress suits seemed best. When the three confederates all chose the same option, the naïve 
participant chose this option as well. However, in a control condition where there were no 
confederates, participants’ choice of dress suit did not vary significantly from by a chance. 
Hence, in the presence of group pressure, a particular suit preferred by the majority was more 
likely to be chosen, but in the absence of group pressure each suit was equally likely to be 
chosen as the best suit.  
Similarly, Cialdini and colleagues (1990) show that people tend to increase norm- 
consistent behavior when the norm is salient to them. In their study, participants had the 
opportunity to litter either in a previously clean or a heavily littered environment. In the high 
salience of group norm condition, they saw a confederate drop trash in the environment. In the 
low salience of group norm condition, they saw a confederate who just passed by the situation. 
When the group norm favored littering, participants littered more in the littered environment than 
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in the clean environment. More importantly, this tendency was stronger when the group norm 
was salient than not (Cialdini et al., 1990).  
Cultural factors. There are cultural differences in conformity (Aaker & Maheswaran, 
1997; Aaker & Williams, 1998; Bond & Smith, 1996; Briley, Wyer, & Li, 2014; Choi, Nisbett, 
& Norenzayan, 1999; Han & Shavitt, 1994; Lin, 2001).  A recent review of cultural influence 
indicates that because East Asians are disposed to think of themselves as part of a collective, 
they may be more likely to be influenced by the opinions of others than Westerners are (Briley et 
al., 2014). Hence, East Asians are more likely to respond to messages that emphasize group 
benefits rather than self-focused appeals (Aaker & Williams, 1998; Han & Shavitt, 1994; Lin, 
2001). 
For example, Bond and Smith (1996) show that residents of collectivist countries are 
more inclined to conform to others’ opinions than are residents of individualistic countries. 
Similarly, Choi, Nisbett, and Norenzayan (1999) show that East Asians weigh consensus 
information more heavily than North Americans, who perceive consensus information as 
relatively nondiagnostic. This difference has been confirmed in a marketing context. Aaker and 
Maheswaran (1997), for example, indicated that Chinese participants were more likely to 
conform to other consumers’ evaluations of a target product than Americans were.  
In sum, when individuals make evaluations in a social context (e.g., they need to justify 
their decisions or their decisions are susceptible to others’ reactions), they may want to follow 
the majority’s behaviors. In this case, a social desirability motive may be the predominant 
influence on their decision. 
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2.2.2 Informational motives 
In contrast, when a decision situation is not related to these social aspects, individuals’ 
behaviors are more likely to be based on informational considerations. For example, when 
people make decisions regarding an online auction, how others expect them to behave is of little 
concern. Therefore, when they choose the most preferred option, they tend to have stronger 
informational than social desirability motives (Dholakia, Basuroy, & Soltysinski, 2002).  
Evidence that product popularity can serve as an informational motive by providing 
indications of a product’s quality was discussed by Mackie (1987), who suggests that a group’s 
opinion may be inferred to reflect objective reality. Research on audience responses also shows 
that people tend to apply a simple consensus heuristic: if other people think the message is 
correct, it is probably valid (Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987). Similarly, people learn the 
fundamental value of an object (e.g., quality of products) by observing others’ behavior (e.g., 
purchase decisions). This may be because they tend to believe that others' decisions are based on 
decision-relevant information that they do not personally possess (Banerjee, 1992; Bonabeau, 
2004). Therefore, decision makers follow others’ choices because they infer a product’s quality 
from whether others have chosen it (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992).  
These inferences can outweigh their own information about the products, increasing 
individuals’ conformity to their predecessors’ actions (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Hence, 
product popularity can have a considerable influence on consumers’ judgments when they wish 
to make an objectively good decision (Cialdini, 2009; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004).  
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2.2.3 Other possible mechanisms 
However, other possible factors can also determine the influence of popularity 
information. For example, popularity information can make popular options more noticeable 
than alternatives. Thus, when consumers are not fully informed about the set of choices 
available, they might sometimes choose one of the more popular choices simply because these 
choices are more salient. However, the effect of salience is not as strong as other effects I have 
reviewed. In the aforementioned study by Cai et al. (2009), table cards naming the five most 
popular items in a restaurant boosted the frequency with which these items were ordered by as 
much as 20%. However, cards that highlighted the same five items without providing an 
indication of their popularity had little effect on sales. In other words, even when the salience of 
the five items is similar in two conditions, indications of item popularity have a stronger effect 
on future patrons’ decisions than merely highlighting the names of the alternatives.   
 
2.2.4 Summary 
The studies reviewed in this section provide convergent evidence that popularity 
information leads people to follow what others have chosen because they interpret product 
popularity as either an indication of the product’s social desirability or product quality. The latter 
influence predominates when a decision situation is not related to social aspects such as making 
choices in a public setting or fulfilling a goal of belonging to a desired group. 
Regardless of individuals’ motives, the impact of product popularity on consumer 
decisions is particularly strong when uncertainty is high. That is, people are more likely to rely 
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on others’ choices when other goal-relevant information is either unavailable or difficult to 
process. In the following section, I will discuss research bearing on consumers’ decision 
processes in this case and then situational and individual factors that have influence on the 
impact of product popularity in these processes.  
 
2.3 Impact of Product Popularity in Information Processing 
 
Generally, when other goal-relevant information is either unavailable or difficult to 
process, individuals tend to search for a less effortful, heuristic basis for decisions (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984; Johnson, Payne, & Bettman, 1988; Wood, 2000). This is suggested by the dual-
process model including the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) and heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, 1980). In the following section, I will 
summarize the general implications of the dual-process models and then discuss factors that 
influence the effect of product popularity. 
 
2.3.1 Dual process model: The elaboration likelihood and heuristic-systematic models 
A rich body of research has shown that individuals process information either 
systematically via a central path or heuristically via a peripheral path. The former is a 
comprehensive and analytic tendency to scrutinize a great deal of information whereas the latter 
is a limited mode of information processing that is easier to implement but frequently results in 
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less accurate decisions, biased responses, and preference reversals (Johnson et al., 1988; Russo, 
1977). 
Research on the dual-process model consistently suggests that individuals’ processing 
style depends on their ability and motivation to process information. This model predicts that 
when ability or motivation to comprehend issue-relevant information is sufficient, systematic 
processing through the central route is likely to happen. Hence, the content of a message tends to 
have a significant influence on judgment. However, when ability or motivation is low, a simple 
decision rule (e.g., brand name or expertise of the information source) has a sizable impact on 
judgment.  
A series of studies reveal various factors that change ability and motivation. Factors 
having influence on motivation include need for cognition(Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 
2009), personal relevance (Hazlewood & Chaiken, 1990), task importance (Maheswaran & 
Chaiken, 1991), accountability for one’s attitude judgments (Chaiken, 1980; Tetlock, 1983), 
congruency between recipients’ self-monitoring tendency and the message source (DeBono & 
Harnish, 1988) and exposure to unexpected message content (Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). 
For example, Hazlewood and Chaiken (1990) show that when tasks are not relevant to 
participants they are more likely to lose their motivation to deliberate. Hence, they tend to follow 
the majority’s opinion.  Debono and Harnish (1988) demonstrated that high-self monitoring 
individuals were systematically processing the attractive source's message whereas low self-
monitoring individuals were systematically processing the expert source's message. They 
suggested that this is because the high and low-self monitoring individuals find the issue 
personally involving when the message was endorsed by an attractive source and an expert, 
respectively.  
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Factors that change one’s ability include distraction, message repetition, time pressure 
(Moore, Hausknecht, & Thamodaran, 1986; Ratneshwar & Chaiken, 1991), communication 
modality (Chaiken & Eagly, 1983), knowledge and expertise (Alba & Marmorstein, 1987), direct 
experience with attitude objects (Wu & Shaffer, 1987), positive mood (Mackie & Worth, 1989), 
and anxiety (Jepson & Chaiken, 1990). For a detailed discussion about these factors, see Eagly 
and Chaiken (1993). 
 
According to the dual-process model, when motivation or ability for elaboration is low, 
judgments are subject to situational cues in the absence of deliberation. For example, decision 
makers tend to use simple decision rules such as “experts’ statement can be trusted” or 
“consensus implies correctness.” As a result, they are more likely to agree with the experts’ 
opinion or flock to the majority’s evaluation.  
Information about a product’s popularity may provide such a basis (Shah & 
Oppenheimer, 2008). To this extent, it may play the same role as other heuristics do. That is, 
when consumers feel less motivated or do not have enough cognitive ability to comprehend all of 
the available information, they may be more likely to use product popularity to make judgments. 
For example, when consumers need to evaluate options that they have never been aware of or 
they do not have general product category knowledge to evaluate them, choosing an ideal option 
may be a challenging task. In this case, decision uncertainty and consumer knowledge influence 
consumers’ motivation and/or their ability to process information carefully. Hence, the effect of 
product popularity on information processing depends on these two factors. In the next section, I 
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will review the relevant literature about how these situational and individual factors increase or 
decrease the effect of product popularity on consumer decisions.  
 
2.3.2 Situational factors: High decision uncertainty 
The effect of others’ opinions is likely to increase with decision uncertainty (Baron, 
Vandello, & Brunsman, 1996; Gino & Moore, 2007; Mackie, 1987; Sasaki et al., 2011). This is 
probably because when a decision outcome is not obvious, people tend to assume that the 
group’s opinion “reflect[s] objective reality and others’ decisions are based on information that 
they personally do not possess” (Bonabeau, 2004; Mackie, 1987).  
Much research provides supporting evidence. Roselius (1971) show that when people 
perceive the risk of making the wrong decision to be high, they believe that others’ opinions will 
help to relieve the perceived risk. Thus, they may seek advice from others (Dowling & Staelin, 
1994). Likewise, people tend to put more emphasis on what others believe when a decision is 
complex. In a recent study, Gino and Moore (2007) show that people tend to overweight advice 
if a task is difficult and underweight it if a task is easy. Similarly, Sasaki and colleagues (2011) 
indicate that people are more likely to choose the most popular option when the amount of 
attribute information provided is large, thereby exceeding their capacity to process it.  
Moreover, the tendency to follow others’ evaluations tends to be strong when the value of 
the outcome for any individual is relatively difficult to determine. For example, participants in an 
experiment by Wooten and Reed (1998) viewed a histogram of positive or negative ratings of 
paper tissue that were ostensibly provided by sixteen students in an earlier experiment. Then, 
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they evaluated the quality of the tissue. However, some participants were able to determine the 
product quality by wiping up a spill with the towels, whereas others could only test the paper 
towel’s quality by rubbing or ripping it. As expected, participants were more influenced by 
previous consumers’ product ratings in the second case than in the first.  
However, the importance of the task can also play a role. That is, people are less likely to 
conform to others’ opinions when a task is not important. In a study by Baron, Vandello and 
Brunsman (1996), participants along with confederates viewed a series of pictures, and then 
responded to questions about them. Each picture was presented for either 1 second or 10 
seconds.  Participants based their responses on confederates’ (incorrect) answers only when (a) 
the pictures were presented for a short time and (b) they believed that their responses were 
important rather than part of a pilot test. 
These findings suggest that when decision uncertainty is high, consumers are more likely 
to rely on product popularity than on attribute information that is more difficult to evaluate. 
However, this tendency may depend on individually differing factors such as product category 
knowledge, as will be described in the following section. 
 
2.3.3 Individual factors: The effect of consumer product knowledge on information processing 
strategy 
Consumers’ information processing strategy can depend on their product category 
knowledge. In general, knowledgeable consumers have greater ability (Alba & Hutchinson, 
1987) and motivation to process product information (Mehta et al., 2011; Nam et al., 2012), 
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whereas consumers with little product category knowledge may feel both unable and 
unmotivated to do so. Therefore, the strategy that consumers use to process product information 
may differ. 
Several studies have investigated this difference. Knowledgeable consumers are more 
likely than novices to engage in demanding evaluation strategies. Therefore, they tend to devote 
more cognitive resources to the processing of messages and generate a greater number of 
thoughts about the message content (Edell & Mitchell, 1978; Maheswaran & Sternthal, 1990; 
Sujan, 1985). For example, Nam, Wang, and Lee (2012) found that experts are more likely than 
novices to consider the non-alignable attributes of a product (i.e., attributes that are not 
comparable to those of alternative products) when making product evaluations and decisions.  
 In contrast, less knowledgeable individuals tend to limit their decision effort. For 
instance, they tend to focus more on “nonfunctional" attributes (e.g., brand name and price) than 
on attribute information when evaluating product information (Park & Lessig, 1981). In addition, 
Ratneshwar and Chaiken (1991) showed that participants with limited ability to comprehend 
product information relied more on the expertise of the product’s inventor when evaluating a 
product. Although the effect of consumer knowledge was not the focal point of their research, 
their work has important implications for the nature of this effect. That is, when participants had 
limited ability to process product information, they felt more positively about an unfamiliar 
product if it was invented by an expert rather than a novice. When they felt they had the ability to 
evaluate the product, however, their evaluations did not depend on the inventors’ expertise. 
Thus, they tended to rely on the expertise of the source only when they personally lacked the 
ability to evaluate the product information.  
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Some research has shown that knowledgeable consumers’ ability and motivation may 
have the opposite effect. Specifically, because knowledgeable consumers are more effective 
information processors (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987), they may seek out less attribute information 
(Radecki & Jaccard, 1995), spend less time making decisions and examine fewer options (Lee, 
Herr, Kardes, & Kim, 1999). 
Overall, however, existing research converges on the notion that knowledgeable 
consumers are able and motivated to comprehend product attribute information while 
unknowledgeable consumers tend to rely on heuristics in order to minimize their decision effort. 
This different processing tendency affects how consumers react to product popularity when 
making product evaluations. That is, depending on consumers’ knowledge level, product 
popularity may make the product evaluation more or less complicated. The detailed discussion 
about this difference in product information processing will be discussed in the following 
section.  
 
2.3.4 The role of consumer knowledge on the effect of product popularity on attribute 
information processing 
The previous discussion indicates that the level of consumer knowledge leads to different 
processing styles when individuals use product popularity. On the one hand, consumers with 
little product category knowledge may give relatively more weight to heuristic cues. Hence, they 
may tend to use others’ opinions as a decision shortcut, increasing the heuristic impact of product 
popularity on their evaluation (Brucks, 1985).   
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On the other hand, research also suggests that when people feel confident in their product 
knowledge, they may consider information about others’ opinions to be disruptive when making 
product evaluations. Therefore, they may ignore others’ opinions. In a study by Brucks (1985), 
for example, participants were given an opportunity to explore information about different types 
of sewing machines along with salespersons’ opinions. When they felt confident of their 
knowledge about the product category, they were less likely to seek and rely on a salesperson’s 
recommendation. In some cases, this tendency may result in less accurate judgments. Yaniv 
(2004) reported that knowledgeable participants gave greater weight to their own opinions and 
discounted others’ opinions in a memory task. As a result, they benefitted less from these 
opinions than less knowledgeable participants did.   
Furthermore, knowledgeable consumers may be annoyed by others’ opinions. When 
individuals know the available options well enough to have a strong a priori preference, exposure 
to others’ opinions causes conflict with this preference, generating emotionally (Fitzsimons & 
Lehmann, 2004) and cognitively negative outcomes (Goodman et al., 2013). In a study by 
Fitzsimons and Lehmann (2004), for example, participants evaluated two attractive and two 
unattractive product options along with a product recommendation. In one condition, the valence 
of the recommendation was congruent with the product’s attractiveness; in another case, it was 
incongruent. Participants experienced greater decision difficulty, lower decision satisfaction, and 
greater psychological reactance in the second condition than in the first. Thus, their decisions 
were typically opposed to the recommendation. (That is, they were more likely to choose the 
attractive option when a negative recommendation was provided than when a positive one was 
provided.) In addition, ads that conveyed a product’s popularity (e.g., “bestseller”) that conflict 
with knowledgeable consumers’ preexisting preferences can increase decision difficulty and 
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decrease their motivation to make a purchase (Goodman et al., 2013). Both of these studies 
therefore provide evidence that others’ opinions about products (e.g., an expert’s 
recommendation or a bestseller sign) can conflict with knowledgeable consumers’ existing 
preferences, decreasing their decision satisfaction. 
 
2.3.5 Summary and discussion 
The preceding discussion indicates that consumers’ reaction to product popularity 
depends on situational and individual factors. When decision uncertainty is high and consumers 
lack product category knowledge, they may use product popularity as a mental shortcut to cope 
with decision uncertainty. In this case, product popularity has a positive influence on their 
evaluation. When consumers feel confident about their product knowledge, however, they tend 
to ignore others’ opinions or even react against them.  
However, this conclusion may hold only when the level of consumers’ general 
knowledge coincides with their knowledge about the particular assortment. That is, people who 
are knowledgeable about a type of product are frequently assumed to know a good deal about the 
specific products of that type. Previous research on the effect of knowledge (e.g., Fitzsimons and 
Lehmann, 2004, Yaniv, 2004, and Goodman et al., 2013) has typically been based on this 
assumption.  Outside of the laboratory, however, consumers are often faced with a set of 
unfamiliar options regardless of their level of product knowledge, which leaves them feeling 
uncertain about the options for which they lack a priori preferences. As mentioned earlier, 
manufacturers and retailers keep updating their product assortment in an attempt to better meet 
the needs of target consumers (Kahn, 1998; Kotler, 1991) and introducing exclusive brands that 
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are sold only in specific stores (e.g., Blueberry Muesli cereal at Trader Joe’s). Accordingly, even 
though consumers feel confident about their general knowledge about a cereal, for example, it is 
impossible for them to know about all the cereal options in a store. 
However, existing research has not fully examined the effect of product popularity when 
consumers’ general product category knowledge is not directly useful for evaluating particular 
options. Hence, it is not clear whether knowledgeable consumers who consider unfamiliar 
options respond to popularity information in the way that previous research suggests (i.e., 
ignoring or becoming annoyed by the information). In this thesis, I reveal the effect of popularity 
in this unexplored situation. 
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CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT  
 
I suggest that when consumers’ knowledge about the general product category is not 
useful for consumers to evaluate unfamiliar options in a given assortment, the effect of product 
popularity on consumer decision is not obvious. I hypothesize that product popularity makes 
consumers perceive what they do not know by providing a point of comparison between their 
own and others’ knowledge about the particular options. Furthermore, I expect that 
knowledgeable people tend to be more sensitive to this knowledge discrepancy than those with 
limited product category knowledge. Additionally, I argue that this tendency persists when 
making a decision is more versus less psychologically demanding.   
To explain this unrevealed effect of product popularity, I introduce the concept of 
epistemic curiosity or the desire for particular type of knowledge. In this chapter, I briefly review 
research bearing on the impact of epistemic curiosity and develop a theoretical framework to 
explain the effect mentioned above. 
 
3.1 Epistemic Curiosity 
 
In this section, I will discuss the general effect of epistemic curiosity resulting from the 
feeling of not-knowing and its implications for consumer decisions. 
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3.1.1 General effect of epistemic curiosity 
Epistemic curiosity is the feeling of deprivation that results from awareness of a gap 
between what one knows and what one wants to know (Loewenstein, 1994). Research provides 
several determinants of epistemic curiosity such as the importance of questions and violated 
expectations (Golman & Loewenstein, 2012; Loewenstein, 1994), novelty, ambiguity and 
uncertainty (Silvia, 2008; Spielberger & Starr, 1994), as well as one’s knowledge about a topic 
(van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007).   
Once aroused, epistemic curiosity may stimulate attempts to satisfy it (Litman & 
Jimerson, 2004; Litman & Lunsford, 2010; Loewenstein, 1994). That is, when the answer to a 
question is not known, curious individuals are often intrinsically motivated to attain the answer 
(Berlyne, 1954a; Berlyne, 1960; Berlyne, 1966). This phenomenon is commonplace in daily life. 
For instance, when people watch someone chuckle as he or she reads a news article, they may be 
curious as to the article’s content and be more motivated to read the article themselves than they 
otherwise would be (Loewenstein 1994).  
Curious individuals’ desire to reduce their feeling of uncertainty can persist even when a 
cost is incurred in order to satisfy this desire. In a study by Kang and colleagues (2009), for 
example, participants were asked questions about their general knowledge (e.g., “What 
instrument was invented to sound like a human singing?”). The results showed that participants 
who were more curious about the answers devoted more resources to attain them (Kang et al., 
2009). 
Furthermore, epistemic curiosity leads people to make decisions that they would usually 
be reluctant to make. In a study by Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2007), participants had to choose 
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either €15 or a sealed package as a reward for their participation. In one condition, no additional 
information about the package was provided. In a second, participants were given limited 
information about the shape of the package content (e.g., round or not round). In addition, 
participants in an “unconditional feedback” condition were informed about what was in the 
package at the end of the session, regardless of their reward choice. However, in the “conditional 
feedback” condition, only those who chose to receive the package were informed about its 
content.  The results showed that, in the conditional feedback condition, participants were more 
likely to opt for the sealed package than for the €15 when they had some knowledge about its 
content. The authors suggested that these participants experienced greater curiosity and, 
therefore, were motivated to resolve it by choosing the uncertain option over the other with clear 
monetary value. Although individuals usually like to avoid making a decision they might regret, 
they may nevertheless make such a decision because of their curiosity about the unknown 
package (van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2007).  
Evidence of the effects of epistemic curiosity in consumer research is limited. However, 
Menon and Soman (2002) showed that when participants viewed an ad about an ambiguous 
product (e.g., SONY QV), those who were given a small amount of information about the target 
product (e.g., an indication of the product category: “SONY QV is a camera”) showed greater 
epistemic curiosity than individuals who did not have this information. As a result, they spent a 
relatively longer time looking at the ad and asked more questions about the product being 
advertised.  
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3.1.2 The effects of epistemic curiosity on the impact of product popularity 
Although consumers may frequently be faced with a decision situation that requires them 
to consider a number of unfamiliar options in spite of their general product category knowledge 
as described in page 3 and 21, their feeling of not-knowing about unfamiliar options may become 
salient only after they compare their knowledge about the particular options to others’. As noted 
by Loewenstein (1994), people make different judgments depending on their reference point. 
Thus, people are not always aware of their feeling of not-knowing until they compare themselves 
with others who seem to be able to identify good options among an assortment with which they 
are unfamiliar.  
To illustrate, when consumers view a list of unfamiliar cakes on a menu, they may think 
“I am not sure what to choose since everything looks so good.” However, if popularity 
information about the cakes is available, they may realize that others know more about these 
unfamiliar cakes than they do, making their feeling of not-knowing about the specific list of 
alternatives more salient.  In other words, by implying that others know a good deal about these 
unfamiliar options, product popularity may act as a point of comparison between their 
knowledge and others’ about a specific assortment, thus triggering epistemic curiosity.  
Hence, I suggest that product popularity increases the salience of the gap between what 
people know (their general product category) and what they wish to know and what others seem 
to know (knowledge about the particular options).  
 
 
 
27 
 
3.1.3 Epistemic curiosity and consumer knowledge 
Epistemic curiosity is positively related to one's knowledge in a particular domain 
(Loewenstein, 1994).  As one gains knowledge about a particular topic, two things can happen. 
First, knowledgeable individuals become more likely to focus on what they do not know rather 
than what they do know. This tendency may be strong when the discrepancy between the two is 
moderately large. This prediction was supported by previous studies. Berlyne (1954b) showed 
that participants experienced greater curiosity about answers to questions about familiar animals 
than unfamiliar ones. Jones (1979) also found that participants felt more curious about answers 
to questions when they had some knowledge about the topic to which the questions pertained 
than when they had little or no knowledge about it. Van Dijk and Zeelenberg’s (2007) 
experiment that I described earlier also suggests that participants with some knowledge about an 
uncertain object experienced greater curiosity than those without it. These studies show that 
people feel curious when the gap in their knowledge is moderate rather than small or very large.  
Second, individuals’ curiosity may be related to their belief that they can decrease the gap 
in their knowledge (Loewenstein, 1994). Because people’s curiosity reflects a desire to close the 
gap in their knowledge, their curiosity will be greater when they perceive that this goal can be 
accomplished.  For example, if consumers possess high level of general product knowledge, they 
may feel that comprehending the product information is a doable task while consumers with low 
product knowledge may consider that the task is hard to do. As a result, the former group of 
consumers may feel more curious about the options than the latter group  
These considerations indicate that if people feel confident about their general product 
knowledge but not about a particular set of options, product popularity makes the possible gap in 
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their knowledge more salient. Because they are likely to be sensitive to their feeling of not-
knowing about the particular assortment, they may feel curious about it and therefore, may be 
intrinsically motivated to resolve it. However, when people have little product category 
knowledge, they may not feel much curiosity.  
However, knowledgeable consumers’ epistemic curiosity may depend on how demanding 
a decision is perceived to be.  
 
3.1.4 Epistemic curiosity and size of assortment 
Consumers tend to perceive a choice task to be psychologically demanding when the 
number of unfamiliar options is large. In particular, choosing from a large assortment can lead to 
information overload (Gourville & Soman, 2005). As a result, the availability of many different 
options can lead to two conflicting outcomes. Although consumers prefer choosing from larger 
assortments, the availability of many different options can demotivate consumers (Iyengar & 
Lepper, 2000) because they are overwhelmed by the perceived demand of the decision.  
When making a decision is demanding, consumers tend to rely on cognitively effortless 
decision processes (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Johnson et al., 1988). Thus, they may rely on 
popularity information rather than on attribute information. This inclination to rely on product 
popularity is prevalent when unknowledgeable consumers make choices from among a number 
of unfamiliar options. Accordingly, they may opt to use product popularity information as a 
decision shortcut rather than feel curious about the assortment. 
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However, the role of assortment size may function differently for knowledgeable 
consumers. I expect that their feeling of not-knowing may be more prominent when the 
assortment is large than small because product popularity would emphasize what others have 
done in the demanding situation. That is, product popularity in a large assortment leads 
knowledgeable consumers to notice that in spite of the high demand in the assortment, others are 
able to distinguish the good ones among the options.  
In addition, those with high confidence in their knowledge may feel that if others are able 
to determine the best options in the assortment, they should be able to do so, too. Hence, 
knowledgeable consumers may perceive their knowledge gap to be more resolvable with than 
without product popularity. Hence, I expect that even though making a decision from among a 
large, unfamiliar assortment is often believed to be demanding, the intensity of consumers’ 
curiosity would be increased.  
When product popularity information is available in a small assortment, however, 
knowledgeable consumers’ feeling of not-knowing may not be as prominent and they may feel 
less curious. I speculate that because of their confidence in their product category knowledge, 
they may perceive making a choice from the less demanding assortment as a simple task that 
anyone could do, decreasing the salience of the knowledge gap.  
Taken together, when product popularity information is available, knowledgeable 
consumers’ tendency to reduce the apparent gap in their knowledge would be stronger in a large 
than small assortment. Accordingly, they would deliberate on the product attribute information to 
resolve their curiosity. However, this is not the case for those with limited product knowledge. 
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3.2 Summary and Hypotheses 
To summarize the implications of the preceding analysis, providing information about 
products’ popularity may make knowledgeable consumers aware of the gap between their 
general knowledge about the product category and their knowledge about the particular products 
being considered. Consequently, they may feel curious about the assortment and, therefore, think 
more carefully about the products’ attributes to resolve their curiosity. As a result, the attributes 
are likely to have a greater impact on their judgments than they would if popularity information 
was not provided.   
In contrast, consumers who feel they have little knowledge about the category of products 
they are considering are likely to have little confidence in their ability to evaluate the information 
about the products’ attributes. Therefore, they perceive the decision to be demanding and 
therefore may be likely to rely on product popularity when evaluating the products. 
 These considerations lead to the following hypotheses: 
H1:  The presence of product popularity information will increase knowledgeable 
consumers’ consideration of product attribute information. 
H2:  The presence of product popularity information will increase knowledgeable 
consumers’ willingness to make a purchase. 
H3:  The presence of product popularity information will increase knowledgeable 
consumers’ decision confidence. 
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H4:   The effect of popularity cues on knowledgeable consumers’ purchase intention 
[decision confidence] will be stronger when the choice set size is large than when 
it is small. 
H5:  Attention to product attribute information will mediate the effects of popularity on 
consumers’ purchase intention to a greater extent when the choice set size is large 
than when it is small.  
H6:     The impact of attribute information on consumer judgment will increase with 
participants’ perception of their general knowledge about the product category to 
which choice alternatives belong. 
  
 Three experiments examined the implications of these hypotheses.  Experiments 1 and 2 
show that cues indicating product popularity increase knowledgeable consumers’ attention to 
product attribute information, leading to greater intention to purchase and greater decision 
confidence. Experiment 3 shows that popularity cues increase the impact of product attribute 
information on knowledgeable consumers’ product evaluations but not on unknowledgeable 
consumers’ evaluations. Moreover, the effect of popularity cues on deliberative processing is 
observed regardless of whether participants’ perception of their product knowledge is assessed 
(Experiment 2) or experimentally manipulated (Experiment 3).  
 
 
 
 
32 
 
CHAPTER 4 EXPERIMENTS 
 
4.1. Experiment 1- The effect of product popularity on decision outcome 
 
This experiment showed that (a) knowledgeable consumers engage in more deliberative 
processing in the presence of popularity cues and (b) this greater processing leads to stronger 
purchase intention.  Furthermore, the effects are more evident when the choice demand is high 
(i.e., the choice set size is large).  
 
4.1.1 Operationalization of key variables 
Perceived popularity. Many studies on product popularity have used the actual number of 
options chosen or sold as an index of popularity. For example, Tucker and Zhang (2011) used the 
number of clicks on link to a target online shopping mall that previous visitors had made and 
Salganik and colleagues used the number of downloads of songs (Salganik et al., 2006; Salganik 
& Watts, 2008) as a proxy for popularity.  
Instead of the actual number of options chosen, recommendation signage has been often 
used to imply the popularity of products. Cai et al. (2009), for instance, wrote the names of the 
five most popular dishes on a table sign to manipulate item popularity based on actual sales from 
the previous week. Additionally, Goodman and colleagues (2013) tried a simple manipulation of 
popularity by affixing a red “Best Seller” sign to products’ name cards (Goodman et al. 2013).   
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In my studies, product popularity was manipulated in a similar way by using icons 
shaped like people, which were designed to signal how many consumers had chosen each option. 
For example, in the presence of product popularity condition, all three of the people icons were 
shaded for some of the options whereas in the absence of product popularity condition, these 
icons were not available (see Appendix A, B, and C for study materials). A detailed description 
of this product popularity manipulation will be included in the methods section for each 
experiment. 
Product category knowledge. Research on consumer knowledge has identified two types 
of knowledge: objective and subjective knowledge (Brucks, 1985; Park & Lessig, 1981). 
According to Park and colleagues, the former is the storage of accurate information about the 
product class in long-term memory and the latter is people's perceptions of what or how much 
they know about a product class (Park, Mothersbaugh, & Feick, 1994).  
The level of objective product knowledge has been operationalized in terms of actual 
knowledge about a specific product. This includes product familiarity (product experience) and 
expertise (the ability to perform product-related tasks successfully) (Alba & Hutchinson, 1987). 
Hence, some studies use a list of questions to measure participants’ knowledge. For example, 
Brucks (1985) constructed a set of questions about a target product (sewing machine) based on 
pretests. The questions covered several aspects of sewing machine knowledge including 
terminology, available attributes, criteria for evaluating attributes and sewing usage situations.  
In some studies, objective product knowledge was manipulated. Park, Gardner, and 
Thukral (1988), for instance, provided different amounts of product information to subjects prior 
to the main experimental task. Subjects in the low knowledge condition received basic 
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information about the product (e.g., what a videocassette recorder is and what it does). On the 
contrary, subjects in the high knowledge condition received a detailed description of five major 
product characteristics (price; format; quality of picture at fast, slow, and slowest speeds) and 
their relationship to usage outcomes (e.g., efficient use of recording tape) as reported by 
Consumer Reports in addition to the same basic information given in the low knowledge 
condition (Park, Gardner, & Thukral, 1988).  
The level of subjective product knowledge has often been measured with different types 
of scales. For example, Brucks (1985) used two scales to measure participants’ subjective 
product knowledge about sewing machines in general. Participants were asked to rate their 
knowledge of sewing machines as compared to the average woman on a seven-point scale (e.g., 
least knowledgeable (1) to most knowledgeable (7)). Then, they were asked to rate their 
familiarity with sewing machines on a seven-point scale (not at all familiar to extremely 
familiar). 
Subjective knowledge can be manipulated. In a study by Xu and Wyer (2010), all 
participants were told that an agency wanted to know college students’ general knowledge about 
fabrics and they completed a knowledge assessment questionnaire containing 20 binary choice 
questions about fabrics. However, the types of questions they were asked and feedback they 
received varied by condition. That is, in the high relative knowledge condition, participants 
received questions that were relatively easy but were told that more than 90% of previous 
respondents had found the questions very difficult and had answered fewer than five questions 
correctly. In contrast, in the low relative knowledge condition, the knowledge assessment 
questions were difficult but participants were told that more than 90% of previous respondents 
had found these questions easy and had answered more than 15 questions correctly.   
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In my experiments, both types of knowledge (objective and subjective knowledge) were 
studied. To measure participants’ objective knowledge, their experience and expertise about a 
target product was measured based on Alba and Hutchinson’s (1987) distinction. In addition, 
participants’ subjective knowledge was manipulated by following Xu and Wyer (2010). The 
specific information about these two approaches will be found in the methods section for each 
experiment.  
Cognitive demand. Researchers have manipulated cognitive demand in different ways by 
varying the amount of information people need to process. For example, Lavie and colleagues 
suggest, based on load theory, that cognitive demand is closely tied to demands on working 
memory (Fitousi & Wenger, 2011; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004). Hence, the more 
information participants need to remember, the more resources are required, leaving little to 
devote to the current task. In one well-known test, for example, participants are presented with 
and required to remember a set of either one or six digits in low and high cognitive demand 
conditions, respectively. A simple task is given to them followed by a memory task which asks 
participants to recall the set of digits they viewed earlier. The critical finding is that participants’ 
task performance is low under the high cognitive demand condition because participants in this 
condition did not have enough cognitive resources to perform the task well. Similarly, Jacoby 
(1984) identified three cases of cognitively demanding situations in a more marketing context: 
varying the number of product attribute descriptions, the number of available options, and a 
mixture of varying the number of attributes and the number of options.  
Each of these three cases can easily be created in an experimental setting For example, 
the high cognitive demand condition can be created by adding either additional product attributes 
(options) to the attributes (options) in the low cognitive condition, resulting in more product 
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attribute (options) in the high than the low cognitive demand condition. However, if the number 
of product attributes is varied across conditions, the additional product attribute information may 
be familiar to some but not all knowledgeable participants, for example. As a result, 
manipulating the cognitive demand alongside the number of product attributes might result in an 
unintentional influence on the level of product knowledge. The third approach (varying both the 
number of attributes and options) may suffer from the same problem. 
Since the level of consumer knowledge within the high and low demand conditions 
should be consistent, I chose to differentiate choice tasks requiring high and low cognitive 
demand by varying the number of available options. 
The Level of Cognitive Demand. The number of available options is referred to as 
assortment size. Previous research on assortment size has defined it as the total number of SKUs 
offered in that category (Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAlister 1998, 166-176), shelf-space 
allocation (Mcintyre, Shelby H. 1999), or the number of options available at the time of making 
choices (Iyengar and Lepper 2000, 995-1006; Sela, Berger, and Liu 2009, 941-951; Diehl and 
Poynor 2007, 160-161). 
I will follow the last definition because the goal of my thesis is to investigate the effect of 
product popularity when a gap in consumers’ knowledge exists rather than consumers’ response 
to an actual product assortment in a store (where the first or second definition of assortment size 
might be useful).   
A number of studies based on the chosen definition have used two types of assortment 
sizes (Diehl & Poynor, 2010; Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Sela, Berger, & Liu, 2009; White & 
Schlosser, 2006). One type is an extensive-choice in which participants would have to consider a 
 
 
37 
 
reasonably large, but not ecologically unusual, number of options. The other type is a limited-
choice with a relatively small number of choices. In these studies, a smaller sized assortment is 
operationalized as an assortment which includes approximately six options while a larger sized 
assortment is one that includes approximately twenty-four options (White and Schlosser 2006, 
308-309; Iyengar and Lepper 2000, 995-1006). Based on this previous research, I will use six 
different options for a smaller sized assortment and twenty-four different options for a larger 
sized assortment.  
 
4.1.2 Methods 
Subjects and Design. Seventy-nine undergraduate students participated for course credit. 
They were assigned to one of the four cells of a 2 (popularity cues: present vs. absent) × 2 
(choice set size: large vs. small) between-subject design.  
Selection of Stimuli.  Cheesecake was selected as the target product because this category 
was familiar to students in the population from which subjects were drawn.  However, the 
particular items in the choice set were novel. Pretesting was conducted to eliminate alternatives 
that were perceived to be conventional and to have familiar flavors, leaving 24 cheesecakes with 
unique names and various flavors (e.g., Turtle Trio, Gentlemen's Whiskey Torte, and Uptown 
cheesecake). Hence, participants had a high level of knowledge about the product category but 
were not familiar with the specific choice alternatives. 
Construction of Stimuli. Four sets of materials were constructed, two for each choice set 
size. First, the number of options in a choice set was varied, one set for a large size assortment 
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composed of 24 cheesecakes and the other set for a small size assortment in which six options 
were randomly selected from among the 24 items in the large set. 
In the no-cue conditions, only the names and descriptions of the cheesecakes were listed. 
In the popularity-cue conditions, all product descriptions were accompanied by three people-
shaped icons, either two or three of which were shaded blue to denote their relative popularity, 
average and higher popularity, respectively. In each listing, half of the cakes were tagged with 
three blue icons and half with only two out of three. (see Appendix A for the study stimuli.)  
Procedure. Participants were introduced to the computer-based experiment with 
instructions to choose a cheesecake in a hypothetical cake shop called "The Gourmet 
Cheesecake," which they might find on campus. They were asked to imagine a situation in which 
they would need to find a cheesecake for a dinner at a friend’s house. They were informed that 
the cake shop had a variety of flavors of cheesecakes, which were all similar in quality and price.  
  The menu of 24 or six types of cheesecake was presented simultaneously on a computer 
screen. After viewing the items, participants chose the one they were most likely to buy. They 
then indicated their intention to purchase the cake they had chosen along three scales from 1 
(extremely unlikely/impossible/improbable) to 7 (extremely likely/possible/probable) (α = .95). 
Participants then indicated to what extent they had carefully considered the descriptions 
(attribute deliberation) on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) and reported their difficulty 
in making a decision along a scale from 1 (extremely difficult) to 7 (extremely easy). For clarity, 
responses to the latter item were reversed so that higher numbers indicated greater difficulty. 
As manipulation checks, participants then indicated the size of the assortment along a 
scale from 1 (extremely small) to 7 (extremely large) and whether the menu they had seen 
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indicated each item’s popularity along a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Finally, participants answered demographic questions regarding their age, gender and English 
proficiency, and were then debriefed. 
 
4.1.3 Results 
Data were analyzed as a function of cueing (popularity cue vs. no cue) and choice set size 
(large vs. small) using participants’ English proficiency as a covariate.   
Manipulation Checks. The manipulation of the choice set size was successful. 
Participants reported that the assortment they had considered was larger in large assortment than 
in small assortment conditions (5.71 vs. 4.27, respectively; F (1, 74) = 28.83, p < .0001). The cue 
manipulation was also effective; participants agreed more strongly that the cheesecake 
assortment included popular cheesecakes in the popularity-cue condition than in the no-cue 
condition (5.51 vs. 5.00, respectively; F (1, 74) = 4.40, p < .05).  No higher order effects were 
significant. 
Purchase Intention. Participants’ willingness to purchase the cake they had chosen, their 
reported consideration of product attribute descriptions, and the difficulty of making a choice are 
summarized in Table 1 as a function of choice set size and the presence of popularity cues. 
Analysis of purchase intention revealed a significant interaction of these variables (F (1, 74) = 
4.47, p < .05). Specifically, when the choice set size was large, participants reported greater 
purchase intention when popularity cues were provided than when they were not (6.20 vs. 5.48, 
respectively - directional F (1, 74) = 4.9, p < .03), whereas when the choice set size was small, 
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purchase intention was not dependent on the presence of popularity cues (5.67 vs. 6.05, 
respectively; F < 1, ns).  
 
Table 1--Results of Experiment 1 
 Popularity cues (SD) No cues (SD) 
Intention to purchase  
       Small choice set            5.67 ab (1.08)                 6.05 ab (1.39) 
       Large choice set            6.20 b     (.72)                 5.48a       (.95) 
Attribute deliberation   
       Small choice set            6.14 ab (1.39)                 6.68 b   (.65) 
       Large choice set            6.40 b     (.99)                 5.70 a (1.45) 
Choice difficulty   
       Small choice set            3.59 a (1.30)                 3.23 a (1.41) 
       Large choice set            4.00 a (1.77)                 3.45 a (1.54) 
 
Cells in each subtable with different subscripts differ directionally at p < .05. 
Attribute Deliberation. I expected that popularity cues would increase participants’ 
attention to attribute descriptions when the choice set size was large but not when it was small. 
This expectation was confirmed, as shown in the second section of Table 1. Analyses of these 
data yielded a significant interaction of cueing and choice set (F (1, 74) = 4.95, p < .05). When 
the choice set size was large, participants reported deliberating more on the attribute descriptions 
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when popularity was cued than when it was not (6.40 vs. 5.70, respectively; F (1, 74) = 3.03, pone-
tailed < .05). When the choice set was small, however, participants reported considering attribute 
descriptions nonsignificantly less in the former condition than in the latter (6.14 vs. 6.68, 
respectively; F (1, 74) = 2.33, p > .10). These data are therefore consistent with H1 that when a 
set of choice alternatives is large, providing product popularity cues does not increase the use of 
these cues as a heuristic. Rather, it increases attention to product attribute information. However, 
this is not true when the choice set was small. 
Choice Difficulty. No differences in choice difficulty were evident. I provide an 
explanation for this result in the discussion section below. 
Mediation analysis. Considered in isolation, the effects of popularity cues on purchase 
intention could be attributed to the use of these cues as information. I speculated, however, that 
the effects are mediated by the effects of these cues on attention to the attribute information.   
Mediation analyses confirmed this speculation. Bootstrapping analyses (Hayes, 2012; Muller, 
Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005; Zhao, Lynch Jr, & Chen, 2010) indicated that the interactive effect of 
cueing and assortment size on intention was indeed mediated by its effect on attribute 
deliberation as I expected in H5; for 1000 bootstrapping samples, 95% CI: 0.0559 to 0.7822, 
excluding 0.  
In addition, as shown in Figure 1, the results showed that both the direct effect of the cue 
by size interaction on attribute deliberation (path a) and the direct effect of attribute deliberation 
on purchase intention were significant (path b), β = 1.20, p < .05 and β = .25, p < .05, 
respectively. Also, consistent with the requirements for mediation, the conditional indirect effect 
of the product of paths a and b is significant (path a × b), with a 95% confidence interval, 
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excluding zero (-.40 to -.003 for small and .01 to .57 for large choice set condition). Furthermore, 
whereas a × b is significant, path c, which reflects an estimate of the direct effect of the 
independent variables and its interaction effect on purchase intention, is non-significant. Thus, 
attribute deliberation functioned as a mediator of purchase intention. 
 
Figure 1-Mediaton analysis in Experiment 4-1 
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4.1.4 Discussion 
When participants made a decision about a product in a category about which they had 
knowledge, the effect of popularity cues depended on the size of the choice set. When the choice 
set was large, the presence of these cues led participants to consider product attribute 
descriptions more carefully, and these descriptions apparently had a greater effect on their 
purchase intention. In contrast, this effect was not evident when the choice set was small.   
Choice difficulty was not varied much across conditions even though choice set size had 
a significant main effect. Although this was not a main goal of Experiment 1, this pattern of data 
is interesting for at least two reasons. First, research supporting a choice overload hypothesis 
(e.g., Diehl and Poynor 2007; Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Mogilner, Rudnick, and Iyengar 2008) 
implies that a large choice set results in greater choice difficulty than a small choice set. Second, 
if participants deliberated on attribute information in a large (vs. small) popularity cued 
condition, it is reasonable to speculate that they experienced greater choice difficulty.   
However, recent research points out that a variety of factors moderate the impact of 
assortment size on choice overload (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, & Todd, 2010), such as 
individual factors (e.g., expertise or preference) and the complexity of the decision problem (the 
nature of product attributes) (Chernev, Bockenholt, & Goodman, 2010). In addition, the 
perceived ease or difficulty of processing information is subjective (e.g., Schwarz, 1998, 2004, 
and Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Hence, it is possible that while 
knowledgeable individuals try to resolve their curiosity, they may not perceive careful 
consideration of attribute information as a difficult task. I elaborate more on this finding and its 
implications in Chapter 5. 
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4.2 Experiment 2- The role of product knowledge in decision outcomes 
 
Because participants in Experiment 1 were knowledgeable about the product category, 
the effects of product knowledge could not be directly examined. In Experiment 2, the category 
(upscale beer that was not widely available) was one about which individuals were likely to have 
different amounts of knowledge. By assessing these individual differences, I obtained evidence 
that popularity cues had different effects on knowledgeable and unknowledgeable participants’ 
attention to product attribute information and that this attention was mediated by its effects on 
epistemic curiosity.   
 
4.2.1 Methods 
Subjects and Design. Ninety-three undergraduates participated to fulfill a course 
requirement. They were randomly assigned to conditions of a 2 (popularity cues: present vs. 
absent) × 2 (choice set size: large vs. small) between-subjects design. Also, participants’ 
experience and expertise with the target product was measured and these responses were used as 
an index of product knowledge.  
 
Selection of Stimuli.  The focal product category in this experiment was beer. As in 
Experiment 1, relatively unfamiliar types of beers were chosen for constructing stimuli, such as 
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Dogfish Head World Wide Stout, Honeywater Motor Boat Ale, and The Bruery Black Tuesday. 
These beers were selected from a website (www.ratebeer.com) based on rating, origin, and 
name: The highest rated beers (stout, ale, and porter) brewed in America, England, and Australia 
were selected.  Furthermore, the attribute descriptions associated with these products were 
modified to include only attributes such as flavor, body, color, and smell. For example, one 
description read: 
Dogfish Head World Wide Stout: This stout is one of the world’s strongest dark beers. 
 Dark, rich, roasted, and complex, World Wide Stout is like a fine port. 
A second read:  
The Bruery Black Tuesday: Aged in bourbon barrels for over a year, this extremely rich 
stout has picked up flavors of vanilla, burnt caramel, toasted oak, prunes, and sherry-like 
oxidation. 
  
Construction of Stimuli. Three stimulus changes were made in Experiment 2 to better 
reflect actual retail settings and for greater experimental control. First, the proportion of 
popularity cued items was decreased from one-half to one-third, thus making popular options 
less salient. Second, because it is rare to see cues indicating lower popularity than others, 
products in the popularity cue conditions had either three icons highlighted or no icons at all. 
Hence, eight out of 24 products were displayed with popularity cues while the rest had attribute 
descriptions without any cues. Finally, to construct small choice sets, four different subsets of the 
24 beers in the large set were used, each set consisting of six items. Thus, pooled over the four 
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subsets, each product was represented an equal proportion of times in each set size condition. 
Data were pooled over the four types of small beer assortments in the analyses to be reported.   
Procedure. The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1.  Participants were 
introduced to the experiment with the information that researchers were interested in students’ 
reactions to products of the sort they might encounter in everyday life and, on this pretense, were 
shown a list of beers on the computer screen. After viewing the list of beers on a computer 
screen, participants were asked to choose the option they were most likely to buy. They then 
indicated their intention to purchase the beer they had chosen on the scales used in the earlier 
experiment. Participants then indicated whether they had considered the attributes of the beers in 
the assortment along scales from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). 
Next, participants reported their confidence (a) that the beer they had chosen would 
satisfy them, (b) that this beer was the best one, and (c) that they would actually like the beer 
they chose, along scales from 0 (not at all confident) to 10 (very confident) (α =.86). Also, they 
indicated their epistemic curiosity using a modified 9-item scale adopted from Leherissey 
(1971). Responses were made on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much). Only four items 
showed reasonably high reliability (α = .72): “I thought it was fun to increase my understanding 
about beers,” “I would enjoy reading more about the beers in this assortment,” “I found myself 
getting tired of reading about the beers in this assortment (reversed),” and “I felt curious about 
the taste of each beer.” These four items were averaged to provide a single measure of 
participants’ overall epistemic curiosity (see Appendix D for the scales of epistemic curiosity).  
Two questions were used as manipulation checks. Specifically, participants estimated the 
size of the assortment along a scale from 1 (extremely small) to 7 (extremely large) and indicated 
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their agreement that “some of the beers appeared to be more popular than others” along a scale 
from 0 (disagree) to 10 (agree). Finally, participants reported their experience and expertise with 
beer along a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Responses to the latter two items were 
used as an index of product knowledge (Pearson correlation, r = .78, p = .0001). 
 
4.2.2 Results 
The effects of experimental variables on dependent variables and manipulation check 
items were each analyzed using regression analyses, treating the perceived product knowledge 
(Z-transformed) as a continuous variable.   
Manipulation checks.  Choice set size was manipulated successfully. Participants 
reported that the size of the choice set was larger when they had seen the large menu than when 
they had seen the small one (5.74 vs. 3.17; F (1, 84) = 84.26, p < .001). No other effects were 
significant.  
Participants’ perception that some products were more popular than others depended on 
cueing, choice set size, and their perceived product knowledge. The three-way interaction of 
choice set size, cueing, and product knowledge was reliable, β = 1.09, SE = .30, t = 3.60, p 
= .0005. The results of spotlight analyses, shown in Table 2, indicate that when the assortment 
was large, knowledgeable participants were more likely to perceive the choice alternatives to 
differ in popularity when popularity cues were provided than when they were not (6.53 vs. 3.80, 
respectively; t (85) = 2.13, p <  .05). However, this difference was not evident among 
unknowledgeable participants (4.55 vs. 5.66, respectively; p > 10). When the assortment was 
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small, popularity cues increased unknowledgeable participants’ perceptions of the products’ 
general popularity (from 2.72 to 5.15; t (85) = 2.21, p < .05), but decreased knowledgeable 
participants’ perceptions (from 6.45 to 3.97; t (85) = 2.07, p < .05). The reason for this latter 
reversal is unclear.   
Dependent variables.  Similar regression analyses of effects of experimental variables on 
the main dependent variables revealed significant three-way interactions of cueing, choice set 
size and product knowledge in analyses of purchase intention (β = .41, SE = .15, t (85) = 2.68, p 
= .009), decision confidence (β = .58, SE = .25, t (85) = 2.34, p = .02), attribute deliberation (β 
= .75, SE = .26, t = 2.90, p = .005), and epistemic curiosity (β = .26, SE = .07, t = 3.73, p 
= .0003). These interactions were diagnosed using spotlight analyses (see Aiken, 1991; Preacher, 
Curran, & Bauer, 2006) of data from participants with high product knowledge (1 SD above the 
mean) and participants with low product knowledge (1 SD below the mean). Data pertaining to 
these analyses are summarized in Table 2 for each dependent variable. 
These data suggest that when the assortment size was small, popularity cues decreased 
participants’ purchase intention, decision confidence, deliberation of attributes and epistemic 
curiosity, and this was generally true regardless of their product knowledge. Moreover, this 
decrease was also generally apparent when the assortment was large and participants reported 
little knowledge about the product category. When the assortment was large and participants 
were knowledgeable, however, the presence of popularity cues increased purchase intention 
(5.62 vs 6.25), decision confidence (3.99 vs. 6.24, respectively; t=2.22, p = .03), attribute 
deliberation (7.33 vs. 8.64) and epistemic curiosity (2.74 vs. 3.25, respectively; directional 
t=1.80, p = 0.04).  
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Table 2 
Purchase Intention, Decision Confidence, Attribute Deliberation and Epistemic Curiosity 
as a Function of Product Knowledge, Choice Set Size and Presence of Popularity Cues—
Experiment 2  
             High Knowledge 
   (+1 SD) 
       Low Knowledge 
(-1 SD) 
Assortment Size Small 
 
Large  
 
Small  
 
Large 
 
Purchase Intention     
             Popularity cues  5.04 6.25 3.95  3.60a 
  No cues  5.95 5.62 4.01  5.36b 
Decision Confidence      
             Popularity cues  5.89   6.24b 3.55 3.49 
  No cues  7.08   3.99a 3.83 4.97 
Attribute Deliberation     
             Popularity cues  7.84 8.64   9.60c    6.37a 
  No cues  8.50 7.33     7.89ab     8.67b 
Epistemic Curiosity     
             Popularity cues     2.68a    3.25b 2.40 2.03 
  No cues     3.52b    2.74a 2.26 2.61 
Cells in each sub-table with different subscripts differ directionally at p < .05. 
Although these differences were not always significant (see Table 2), analyses of each 
assortment size condition separately indicated significant effects of product popularity on 
epistemic curiosity (F (3, 44) = 6.85, p <.001) in the small assortment size condition. When the 
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assortment was large, however, product knowledge had significant interactive effects on 
purchase intention (β = .60, SE = .22, t (45) = 2.81, p = .008), confidence (β = .93, SE = .40, t 
(41) = 2.34, p = .02), attribute deliberation (β = .90, SE = .39, t (45) = 2.26, p = .03) and 
epistemic curiosity (β = .27, SE = .10, t (45) = 2.78, p = .008).  
Moderated mediation analysis. I expected that epistemic curiosity would mediate the 
influence of product popularity on attribute deliberation and this effect would depend on 
participants’ level of product knowledge. If the indirect effect of the highest order interaction 
(choice set size, product knowledge, and the presence of product popularity) is significant, I can 
draw the conclusion that the moderation is mediated.  
I tested for this moderated mediation using bootstrapping analyses as in Experiment 4.1 
(Hayes, 2012; Muller et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2010). Hayes suggests that ‘‘if the CI does not 
contain 0, [the] null hypothesis of no conditional indirect effect can be rejected.” As expected, a 
bootstrap analysis confirmed an indirect effect of the three-way interaction on attribute 
deliberation through epistemic curiosity (for 1000 bootstrapping samples, 95% CI: .1466 
to .8948, excluding 0).  
Furthermore, the conditional direct effect of popularity cues on attribute deliberation was 
not significant at any value of the moderators (size and knowledge). Also, the conditional 
indirect effect of popularity cues on attribute deliberation is significant at all combinations of 
knowledge and assortment size (in high knowledge/small size conditions, 95% CI: -1.42 to -.25; 
in high knowledge/large size conditions, 95% CI:  .0018 to 1.28; and in low knowledge/large 
size conditions 95% CI: -1.41 to -.25) except in low knowledge/small size conditions (95% CI: -
0.40 to .75)). These results indicated that epistemic curiosity mediates the effect of product 
popularity on attribute deliberation when product knowledge is high. 
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In sum, the results of moderated mediation analysis support my expectation that the effect 
of popularity cues on knowledgeable participants’ attention to product attribute information was 
mediated by its effects on epistemic curiosity.  
 
Figure 2- Moderated mediation analysis in Experiment 4-2 
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4.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 confirmed the effect of product popularity on the tendency to deliberate on 
the attribute information.  Furthermore, as I proposed, this depended on perceived product 
category knowledge. That is, when participants perceived their general product category 
knowledge to be relatively high and the choice set was large, providing an indication of others’ 
opinions increased their curiosity about the reasons for these opinions and led them to think more 
extensively about the products’ attribute descriptions. When participants perceived their 
knowledge to be low, or if the assortment size was small, this was not the case.  
 
4.3 Experiment 3- The effect of product popularity on attribute deliberation 
 
Experiment 3 provided more direct evidence of the increased effect of popularity 
information on knowledgeable consumers’ use of product attribute information. In this study, I 
experimentally manipulated participants’ perceptions of their knowledge about the product 
category (wine). Furthermore, I varied the valence of attribute descriptions. If product popularity 
motivates knowledgeable participants to resolve their knowledge gap by deliberating on product 
attributes, this should increase the impact of the attributes’ favorableness on their judgments. In 
contrast, if unknowledgeable consumers are inclined to use popularity information as a heuristic 
basis for judgments, presenting this information should decrease the impact of attribute 
information on their product evaluations. 
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4.3.1 Methods 
One hundred thirty-five members of an online panel were randomly assigned to 
conditions of a 2 (popularity cues: present vs. absent) × 2 (valence of attribute description: 
favorable vs. unfavorable) × 2 (product knowledge: low vs. high) design.   
Construction of Stimuli. A focal product (wine) was chosen for the target product 
category. In addition, 11 filler products were selected of the sort one might serve at a party. For 
the target product, two attribute descriptions were constructed based on pretests. Each 
description contained descriptions of 7 to 8 attributes including aroma, color, and taste. The 
favorable description was consistently positive.  
Rich and full bodied, beautiful ruby red wine. Full flavors of roasted pear and nectarine 
are warmed with spice. The palate is intriguing aromas of spiced apple, warm citrus, and 
vanilla. Clean, delicate, lingering finish with perfectly balanced acidity. This vintage may 
be the best vintage they have produced since 1995. This wine is ready for drinking and 
promises you an extraordinary experience. 
However, the unfavorable wine description mentioned slightly negative and neutral attributes.  
Full bodied red wine. Full flavors of roasted pear and nectarine are warmed with spice. 
The taste is scents of tobacco, dried herbs, and spices. Clean, delicate, long, complex 
finish with good acid integration. This wine is not produced in difficult years. This young 
wine is ready to drink but will acquire its best taste with few more years of aging.  
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The 11 filler items were food items that participants might find at a party such as “Spicy 
Artichoke Spinach Dip” and “Apple Anise Pizza.” Descriptions of these items were generally 
positive and similar in length to the target descriptions. 
Presentation of stimuli materials. The 12 products were shown on an appetizer menu for 
a party. The positive wine description was included in one set along with the11 filler items, and 
the negative wine description was in the other set.  
In the no-cue condition, only the names and descriptions of the products were shown. In 
the popularity-cued condition, six out of 12 items (wine and five of the filler items) were 
popularity cued (with three icons highlighted) and the rest of were presented without any icons at 
all. 
Product knowledge. Participants’ perception of their product knowledge was manipulated 
using a procedure similar to that employed by Xu and Wyer (2010). At the beginning of the 
experiment, participants were given a knowledge assessment questionnaire containing a set of 15 
binary choice (true or false) questions about wine (see Appendix E). In the high perceived 
knowledge condition, many of the questions were relatively easy, and participants were told that 
they had answered 12 of 15 questions correctly, regardless of their actual performance. In the 
low perceived knowledge condition many of the questions were actually difficult, and 
participants were told that they had answered three out of 15 questions correctly.   
A separate pretest with an online panel was conducted to check the knowledge perception 
manipulation. After taking the wine knowledge assessment questionnaire and receiving 
feedback, participants answered a question to indicate their general wine knowledge. Also, they 
reported their perceived difficulty of the wine quiz on a scale from -5 (very easy) to 5 (very 
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difficult) with zero in the middle. Responses to the latter item were transferred to indicate that 
higher numbers mean greater difficulty (from 0 to 10). Participants reported their knowledge to 
be higher in high knowledge conditions than in low knowledge conditions (4.25 vs. 1.89, 
respectively; F (1, 52) = 14.64, p < .01), and perceived the wine quiz to be less difficult in the 
former condition than in the latter (4.47 vs. 6.35, respectively; F (1, 52) = 6.96, p < .01).  Hence, 
I used the same manipulation in the main study. 
 Procedure. Participants were invited to participate in a “product evaluation study.” They 
were told they would be given a short warm-up quiz in order to make them comfortable with the 
task format and, on this pretense, completed the test of wine knowledge described earlier and 
received feedback on their performance. After receiving this feedback, they rated their general 
wine knowledge as a manipulation check along a scale from 0 (I don’t know much about wine) 
to 10 (I have an understanding of wine).  
Then, participants were directed to the main task with the information that researchers 
were interested in people’s evaluation of various types of food items they might find at a party. 
They viewed a list of party food items with or without popularity cues. Next, they were asked to 
evaluate each product including wine and fillers along scales from -5 (very negative/very 
unfavorable/dislike) to 5 (very positive/very favorable/like). Responses along these scales for the 
wine (α = .94) were averaged to provide a single index of product evaluation. Participants then 
indicated their level of product knowledge about the target product (wine) on a scale from 0 (not 
at all knowledgeable) to 10 (very knowledgeable). (Their response to this item was used as the 
second knowledge manipulation check.) Finally, they reported the extent to which the wine quiz 
and descriptions influenced their perception of their wine knowledge along a scale from 0 (not at 
all) to 10 (very much).  
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4.3.2 Results 
Manipulation checks.  Participants’ perception of their wine knowledge was manipulated 
successfully. Immediately after receiving feedback about the wine knowledge quiz, participants 
indicated that they had a better understanding of wine in the high knowledge condition than in 
the low knowledge condition (4.31 vs. 2.44, respectively; F (1, 127) = 15.79, p < .001). This 
difference was also apparent when participants were later asked to indicate their level of wine 
knowledge (4.00 vs. 2.83, respectively; F (1, 127) = 5.48, p < .05).  Despite these differences in 
perception, participants reported that the wine quiz did not influence their perception of their 
wine knowledge. (No effects of experimental variables on these judgments were significant, p 
> .10.) 
The valence of the product descriptions was also manipulated successfully. Participants 
evaluated the wine more favorably when its description was favorable than when it was not (1.35 
vs. 0.44, respectively; F (1, 127) = 4.36, p < .05). 
 
Product evaluations. The evaluation of fillers ranged from .01 to 2.74 (M = 1.95, SD: 
1.36 for all fillers). Participants’ evaluations of the wine are summarized in Table 3 as a function 
of the valence of attribute description, product knowledge and cueing. Analyses of these data 
revealed a significant three-way interaction of these variables (F (1, 127) = 4.49, p < .05). 
Specifically, participants with high wine knowledge perception evaluated the positively valenced 
wine fairly favorably, regardless of the presence of popularity cues (1.84 vs. 1.76 when 
popularity cues were and were not provided, respectively). However, their evaluations of the 
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negatively valenced wines were significantly more negative when the target products were 
presented with popularity cues than when they were not (0.11 vs. 1.33, respectively). Hence, the 
difference between positive and negative evaluations was greater when popularity cues were 
provided than when they were not (1.73 vs. 0.43, respectively).   
Table 3 
 
Mean Ratings of Wine Evaluation  
as a Function of Product Knowledge, the Valence of Attribute Descriptions, and 
Cueing—Experiment 3 
 
Perceived 
knowledge 
 Positive 
Description 
(SD) 
Negative 
Description 
(SD) Difference
High  
 
Popularity cues 
1.84b (2.10)     .11a  (2.73) 1.73*
 No cue 1.76b (3.08)   1.33ab (2.53) .43 
    
Low Popularity cues -.14a (2.68)       .30a (1.33) -.43 
 No cue 1.84b (2.69)      -.15a (2.61) 2.00* 
 
Cells in each subtable with different subscripts differ at p < .05.  
 
When participants perceived their knowledge to be low, however, the opposite was true. 
In the absence of popularity cues, attribute favorableness had an appreciable effect on their 
judgments (1.84 vs. -0.15, when attributes were favorable vs. unfavorable, respectively). When 
the same products were displayed with popularity cues, however, the effect of attribute 
 
 
58 
 
information was negligible (-0.14 vs. 0.30, respectively). The interaction of cueing and attribute 
favorableness was significant in an analysis of data from unknowledgeable participants alone; F 
(1, 59) = 4.68, p < .05.    
 
4.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 4.3 showed that the effect of attribute information on knowledgeable 
participants’ judgments was stronger when popularity cues were provided than when they were 
not. When consumers are knowledgeable about a product category, product popularity cues can 
direct their attention to attribute descriptions and consequently lead these descriptions to have a 
greater effect on judgments than they otherwise would. 
I propose that this happens because indications of others’ preference lead consumers to 
perceive a gap between what they know about the product category in general and what they 
know about the specific product being promoted. In three studies, I showed that this gap in their 
knowledge increases epistemic curiosity and consequently increases their attention to attribute 
information and the influence of this information on judgments. In addition, this tendency is 
greater when the set of choice alternatives is large than when it is small. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation investigated the influence of product popularity cues on consumer 
decision making, especially when there is a gap between consumers’ knowledge about a product 
category and a specific product assortment.  
Previous research has focused on the effect of product popularity on consumers’ 
decisions when their general product category knowledge is either useful or not useful in helping 
them evaluate unfamiliar options. What remains unclear in the existing literature is an 
understanding of how popularity cues influence consumer decisions when consumers’ high 
general product category knowledge is not helpful in their product decision but has an influence 
on their decision process. My research eliminates this deficiency by showing that when 
consumers’ product category knowledge is high but their product assortment knowledge is low, 
product popularity can make people be aware of what they do not know, and therefore make 
them think more carefully about the products’ attributes to resolve their feeling of not-knowing.  
Research reported in Chapter 4 indicates that when consumers are knowledgeable about a 
product category, product popularity cues can direct their attention to attribute descriptions and 
consequently lead these descriptions to have a greater effect on judgments and purchase 
intentions than they otherwise would. I have proposed that this happens because indications of 
others’ preferences lead consumers to perceive a gap between what they know about the product 
category in general and what they do not know about the specific products that are available to 
purchase. This gap in their knowledge increases their epistemic curiosity and, consequently, 
increases their attention to attribute information and the influence of this information on 
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judgments. This tendency is greater when the set of choice alternatives is large than when it is 
small. 
Three experiments confirmed these assumptions. In Experiment 1, where all participants 
were knowledgeable about the type of products they were evaluating, the presence of cues 
increased their attention to the available attribute information and this attention, in turn, mediated 
the effect of product popularity on purchase intention. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed that 
when participants felt knowledgeable about the product category, they felt more curious about 
the product assortment when popularity cues were provided and the number of choice 
alternatives was large. As a result, they deliberated more on the product attribute information and 
felt more confident about their decisions. When participants were not knowledgeable, this was 
not the case.  
Finally, Experiment 3 provided more direct evidence of the effect of popularity cues on 
attention to attribute information by manipulating the valence of product descriptions and 
participants’ perceived product knowledge. This study showed that the effect of attribute 
information on knowledgeable participants’ judgments was stronger when popularity cues were 
provided than when they were not. In contrast, the effect of attribute information on 
unknowledgeable participants’ judgments decreased when these cues were presented.  
It should be noted that although some participants in Experiment 1 deliberated on 
attribute information, they did not report increased decision difficulty over those in other 
conditions. One might wonder why decision difficulty did not vary across conditions even 
though previous research indicates a positive relationship between deliberative processing and 
decision difficulty. As people process more product attributes, they should experience greater 
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processing difficulty (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper 2000). As mentioned in the discussion of 
Experiment 1, however, there are a variety of moderators of the effect of assortment size on 
choice overload (Chernev et al., 2010; Scheibehenne et al., 2010) including individual factors 
and the complexity of the decision problem.  
The most likely reason for this result is that when trying to resolve their curiosity, 
deliberating on product attributes may not be as burdensome. This speculation is consistent with 
research demonstrating that the perceived ease or difficulty of processing information is 
subjective. People can process the same information with different degrees of perceived 
difficulty (Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz, 2004; Winkielman, Schwarz, Reber, & Fazendeiro, 2003). 
In addition, when people are motivated to achieve their goal, they may expect that a means to 
fulfill the goal will require investing effort (Labroo & Kim, 2009). Research on epistemic 
curiosity also indicates that curiosity can make people do things that require more resources 
(Kang et al., 2009; Menon & Soman, 2002). In line with this research, I demonstrate that even if 
considering attribute information carefully may require more cognitive effort and, therefore, 
possibly increase the overall decision difficulty, pursuing an epistemic goal may make people 
engage in effortful processing.   
Similar patterns of results have been observed in prior research. Fitzsimons and Lehmann 
(2004) showed that people may experience greater decision difficulty when an unattractive 
option is recommended over a clearly better option, generating psychological reactance. Also, 
Goodman et al. (2013) demonstrated that when consumers have existing preferences, they tend 
to experience greater decision difficulty because they tend to consider more options. 
Furthermore, when an assortment size is large and preference conflict is high, this tendency is 
stronger than otherwise. However, these explanations are not sufficient to explain my findings.  
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First, in my studies, all options are described favorably except the negative wine 
description in Experiment 3. However, this manipulation of the valence of product attributes was 
to see how the valence of attribute information is reflected in participants’ product judgments 
rather than to create a situation in which a preference conflict exists. Furthermore, unlike the 
prior research that included one obviously better option than the rest of the options, a significant 
portion of the options were cued with product popularity (e.g., half the items in Experiment 1). 
Hence, participants hardly felt that their choices were restricted and were not annoyed by the 
recommended options.  
Second, in my studies, participants’ preferences are less likely to exist because the 
product assortments used in my studies consisted of unfamiliar options that are not easily 
available in typical grocery stores. Therefore, participants’ knowledge about the product 
assortments in studies should be very low. Therefore, the earlier research cannot explain the 
findings that when there is no obviously better or preferred options, product popularity can 
increase attribute deliberation. 
Some may question whether these consumers with less developed preferences in the 
unfamiliar assortment must deliberate on attribute information in order to construct their 
preferences and make a choice (Chernev, 2003; Coupey, Irwin, & Payne, 1998). However, this 
should be true for making decisions with and without popularity cues and regardless of the 
demands of the choice task. As such, the deliberation due to preference construction cannot 
explain why knowledgeable consumers deliberate on attribute information only in a large and 
popularity cued condition.  
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The current research is the first to identify the circumstances under which product 
popularity can increase decision makers’ attention to product attributes. Although product 
popularity has been considered to mainly have a conformity effect on consumer decisions and to 
tend to decrease their attention to product attributes, my research shows that it is influenced by a 
gap in consumer knowledge and perceived choice demands. 
In addition to furthering the field's understanding of the effect of product popularity, this 
work extends prior research on consumer knowledge and provides a framework that clarifies 
when knowledgeable consumers consider consensus information advantageous rather than 
ignoring or becoming annoyed by it.  
I note, however, a few limitations of the effect. An important boundary for the finding is 
that there are some product domains in which consumers’ knowledge is generally high. For 
example, breakfast cereal is a familiar product to average U.S. Americans. Hence, the difference 
in the level of knowledge may not be as clear as that for other products such as gourmet beer or 
wine. In the case of familiar products, the influence of product knowledge on the effect of 
popularity may not be as strong as what this research discovered.  
In addition, the finding that product popularity makes consumers deliberate more on 
attribute information is based on the assumption that a discrepancy exists, a gap between their 
low product assortment knowledge and their high product category knowledge. In some cases, 
however, it is possible that consumers with limited product category knowledge may feel 
confident with a specific product assortment. In this case, in spite of the gap between these two 
types of knowledge, they might not be able or motivated to deliberate on product attributes. Or, 
due to their strong preexisting preference within the particular assortment, they may experience 
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preference conflict as knowledgeable consumers often do. Further research could examine how 
the effects shown here would vary with the other types of gaps in consumer knowledge.  
Product popularity could potentially have other effects than those I considered in my 
dissertation. This dissertation has been restricted to a situation in which consumers evaluate a set 
of products in a particular category (an assortment of cheesecakes, beer, or wine). However, 
consumers often evaluate products from multiple categories with or without popularity 
information. For example, when consumers explore a vacation plan in Orlando, they may have 
access to a great deal of popularity information about hotels, but limited popularity information 
about rental cars. My research indicates that if consumers feel curious about the available hotels 
due to the popularity information, they are likely to deliberate on the information about hotels. It 
is unclear whether their deliberative processing mode persists when evaluating the second, 
unrelated product, rental cars.  
I speculate that if indications of others’ preferences in a given category motivate 
knowledgeable consumers to fill a gap in their general category knowledge by contemplating the 
implications of attribute information, this disposition could induce a behavioral mindset that 
generalizes to other situations (Wyer & Xu, 2010). As a result, this mindset may lead consumers 
to focus more attention on attribute information in the other situations as well. Thus, for 
example, calling consumers’ attention to their lack of knowledge about wine might influence 
their consideration of specific product attributes when choosing wine but also when choosing 
coffee. In a related vein, Moreau, Lehmann, and Markman (2001) suggest that consumers use 
their existing knowledge in one domain to make inferences about new domains. The conditions 
in which the product popularity has a motivational influence on processing in unrelated 
situations are clearly worth investigating.  
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Finally, this dissertation provides marketers with a better understanding of the conditions 
wherein product popularity information may increase attribute deliberation. More specifically, 
the dissertation sheds light on how knowledgeable consumers use product popularity information 
to make a decision from among unfamiliar options. When marketers present product popularity, 
they would be advised to make detailed attribute information available, especially when they are 
offering unique items and expect to have consumers with generally high product category 
knowledge. For instance, boutique or specialty stores usually deal with unique options. In this 
case, sufficient product attribute information about products should be available along with 
popularity information because consumers who feel confident about their product category 
knowledge but not about the unique items would like to consider detailed information rather than 
simply picking popular options.  
In addition, retailers that deal with exclusive products for a familiar product category 
would be advised to add product popularity information along with the description to introduce 
the unfamiliar product to their consumers. Taken from a previous example, Trader Joe’s sells 
many unconventional items including Blueberry Muesli cereal which is less known by the 
general public. Hence, it is possible that many of its patrons perceive themselves to be 
knowledgeable about cereal products but not the stores’ unique assortment including new types 
of cereal. To help its consumers’ understanding, the store tries to provide a lot of product 
information through different routes from store displays to its website to a mobile application. 
My research suggests that adding popularity information would be useful to make consumers 
curious about the taste of the cereal, possibly resulting in higher purchase intention. 
66 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Aaker, J. L., & Maheswaran, D. (1997). The effect of cultural orientation on persuasion. Journal 
of Consumer Research, 24(3), 315-328.  
Aaker, J. L., & Williams, P. (1998). Empathy versus pride: The influence of emotional appeals 
across cultures. Journal of Consumer Research, 25(3), 241-261.  
Alba, J. W., & Hutchinson, J. W. (1987). Dimensions of consumer expertise. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 13(4), 411-454.  
Alba, J. W., & Marmorstein, H. (1987). The effects of frequency knowledge on consumer 
decision making. Journal of Consumer Research, 14(1), 14-25.  
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a 
unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 70(9), 1-70.  
Axsom, D., Yates, S., & Chaiken, S. (1987). Audience response as a heuristic cue in persuasion. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(1), 30-40.  
Banerjee, A. V. (1992). A simple model of herd behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
107(3), 797.  
Baron, R. S., Vandello, J. A., & Brunsman, B. (1996). The forgotten variable in conformity 
research: Impact of task importance on social influence. Journal of Personality & Social 
Psychology, 71(5), 915-927.  
 
 
67 
 
Berlyne, D. E. (1954a). A theory of human curiosity. British Journal of Psychology, 45(3), 180.  
Berlyne, D. E. (1960). Conflict, arousal, and curiosity. New York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill. 
Berlyne, D. E. (1966). Curiosity and exploration. 153(3731), 25-33.  
Berlyne, D. E. (1954b). An experimental study of human curiosity. British Journal of 
Psychology, 45(4), 256.  
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and 
cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 100(5), 992.  
Bonabeau, E. (2004). The perils of the imitation age. Harvard Business Review, 82(6), 45-54.  
Bond, R., & Smith, P. B. (1996). Culture and conformity: A meta-analysis of studies using asch's 
(1952b, 1956) line judgment task. Psychological Bulletin, 119(1), 111-137.  
Botti, S., & Iyengar, S. S. (2006). The dark side of choice: When choice impairs social welfare. 
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 25(1), 24-38.  
Briley, D., Wyer, R. S., & Li, E. (2014). A dynamic view of cultural influence: A review. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology.  
Brucks, M. (1985). The effects of product class knowledge on information search behavior. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 12(1), 1-16.  
Cai, H., Chen, Y., & Fang, H. (2009). Observational learning: Evidence from a randomized 
natural field experiment. American Economic Review, 99(3), 864-882.  
 
 
68 
 
Carare, O. (2012). The impact of bestseller rank on demand: Evidence from the app market* the 
impact of bestseller rank on demand: Evidence from the app market. International 
Economic Review, 53(3), 717-742.  
Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source 
versus message cues in persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5), 
752-766.  
Chaiken, S., & Eagly, A. H. (1983). Communication modality as a determinant of persuasion: 
The role of communicator salience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45(2), 
241-256.  
Chernev, A. (2003). Product assortment and individual decision processes. Journal of 
Personality & Social Psychology, 85(1), 151-162.  
Chernev, A., Bockenholt, U., & Goodman, J. K. (2010). Commentary on scheibehenne, 
greifeneder, and todd. choice overload: Is there anything to it? Journal of Consumer 
Research, 37(3), 426-428.  
Choi, I., Nisbett, R. E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999). Causal attribution across cultures: Variation 
and universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125(1), 47-63.  
Cialdini, R. B. (2009). Influence: Science and practice. Boston: Pearson Education. 
Cialdini, R. B. (2012). The focus theory of normative conduct. In P. Van Lange, A. W. 
Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of theories of social psychology (pp. 295-
313). London: SAGE Publications Ltd. 
 
 
69 
 
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and conformity. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 55(1), 591-621.  
Cialdini, R. B., Reno, R. R., & Kallgren, C. A. (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: 
Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 58(6), 1015-1026.  
Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. (1998). Social influence: Social norms, conformity, and 
compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, & S. T. Fiske (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology, vol 2 
(4th ed., pp. 151-192). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Coupey, E., Irwin, J. R., & Payne, J. W. (1998). Product category familiarity and preference 
construction. Journal of Consumer Research, 24(4), 459-468.  
David, B., & Turner, J. (2001). Majority and minority influence: A single process self-
categorization analysis. In Dreu, Carsten K. W. de, & N. K. d. Vries (Eds.), Group 
consensus and minority influence: Implications for innovation (pp. 91-121). Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
DeBono, K. G., & Harnish, R. J. (1988). Source expertise, source attractiveness, and the 
processing of persuasive information: A functional approach. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 55(4), 541-546.  
Deutsch, M., & Gerard, H. B. (1955). A study of normative and informational social influences 
upon individual judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51, 624-636.  
 
 
70 
 
Dholakia, U. M., Basuroy, S., & Soltysinski, K. (2002). Auction or agent (or both)? A study of 
moderators of the herding bias in digital auctions. International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, 19(2), 115-130.  
Diehl, K., & Poynor, C. (2010). Great expectations?! assortment size, expectations, and 
satisfaction. Journal of Marketing Research, 47(2), 311-322.  
Dowling, G. R., & Staelin, R. (1994). A model of perceived risk and intended risk-handling 
activity. Journal of Consumer Research, 21(1), 119-134.  
Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich College Publishers. 
Edell, J., & Mitchell, A. (1978). An information processing approach to cognitive responses. In 
American Marketing Association (Ed.), Research frontiers in marketing: Dialogues and 
directions (Subhash C. Jain ed., pp. 178-183) American Marketing Association. 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social cognition. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Fitousi, D., & Wenger, M. J. (2011). Processing capacity under perceptual and cognitive load: A 
closer look at load theory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 37(3), 781-798.  
Fitzsimons, G. J., & Lehmann, D. R. (2004). Reactance to recommendations: When unsolicited 
advice yields contrary responses. Marketing Science, 23(1), 82-94.  
 
 
71 
 
Giner-Sorolla, R., & Chaiken, S. (1997). Selective use of heuristic and systematic processing 
under defense motivation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(1), 84-97.  
Gino, F., & Moore, D. A. (2007). Effects of task difficulty on use of advice. Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 20(1), 21-35.  
Goldstein, N. J., Cialdini, R. B., & Griskevicius, V. (2008). A room with a viewpoint: Using 
social norms to motivate environmental conservation in hotels. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 35(3), 472-482.  
Golman, R., & Loewenstein, G. (2012). Curiosity, information gaps, and the utility of 
knowledge. Unpublished manuscript. 
Goodman, J. K., Broniarczyk, S., Griffin, J., & McAlister, L. (2013). Help or hinder? When 
recommendation signage expands consideration sets and heightens decision difficulty. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 23(2), 165-174.  
Gourville, J. T., & Soman, D. (2005). Overchoice and assortment type: When and why variety 
backfires. Marketing Science, 24(3), 382-395.  
Han, S., & Shavitt, S. (1994). Persuasion and culture: Advertising appeals in individualistic and 
collectivistic societies. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 30(4), 326-350.  
Hanson, W. A., & Putler, D. S. (1996). Hits and misses: Herd behavior and online product 
popularity. Marketing Letters, 7(4), 297-305.  
 
 
72 
 
Hayes, A. F. (2012). An analytical primer and computational tool for observed variable 
moderation, mediation, and conditional process modeling. Unpublished manuscript. 
Hazlewood, D., & Chaiken, S. (1990). Personal relevance, majority influence, and the law of 
large number. Boston: Poster presented at the 98th Annual Convention of the American 
Psychological Association. 
Huang, J., & Chen, Y. (2006). Herding in online product choice. Psychology & Marketing, 
23(5), 413-428.  
Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (2000). When choice is demotivating: Can one desire too much 
of a good thing? Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 79(6), 995-1006.  
Jepson, C., & Chaiken, S. (1990). Chronic issue-specific fear inhibits systematic processing of 
persuasive communications. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 5(2), 61.  
Johnson, E., Payne, J., & Bettman, J. R. (1988). Information displays and preference reversals. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 42, 1-21.  
Jones, R. S. (1979). Curiosity and knowledge. Psychological Reports, 45(2), 639-642.  
Kahn, B. E. (1998). Dynamic relationships with customers: High-variety strategies. Journal of 
the Academy of Marketing Science, 26(1), 45-53.  
Kang, M. J., Hsu, M., Krajbich, I. M., Loewenstein, G., McClure, S. M., Wang, J. T., & 
Camerer, C. F. (2009). The wick in the candle of learning: Epistemic curiosity activates 
reward circuitry and enhances memory. Psychological Science, 20(8), 963-973.  
 
 
73 
 
Kotler, P. (1991). Marketing management: Analysis, planning, implementation, and control. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall. 
Labroo, A. A., & Kim, S. (2009). The “instrumentality” heuristic: Why metacognitive difficulty 
is desirable during goal pursuit. Psychological Science, 20(1), 127-134.  
Lavie, N., Hirst, A., de Fockert, J. W., & Viding, E. (2004). Load theory of selective attention 
and cognitive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133(3), 339-354.  
Lee, H., Herr, P. M., Kardes, F. R., & Kim, C. (1999). Motivated search: Effects of choice 
accountability, issue involvement, and prior knowledge on information acquisition and use. 
Journal of Business Research, 45(1), 75-88.  
Lin, C. A. (2001). Cultural values reflected in Chinese and American television advertising. 
Journal of Advertising, 30(4), 83-94.  
Litman, J. A., & Jimerson, T. L. (2004). The measurement of curiosity as a feeling of 
deprivation. Journal of Personality Assessment, 82(2), 147-157.  
Litman, J. A., & Lunsford, G. D. (2010). Incurious motives to seek information about potential 
threats. European Journal of Personality, 24(8), 639-655.  
Loewenstein, G. (1994). The psychology of curiosity: A review and reinterpretation. 
Psychological Bulletin, 116(1), 75-98.  
Mackie, D. M. (1987). Systematic and nonsystematic processing of majority and minority 
persuasive communications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53(1), 41-52.  
 
 
74 
 
Mackie, D. M., & Worth, L. T. (1989). Processing deficits and the mediation of positive affect in 
persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(1), 27-40.  
Maheswaran, D., & Chaiken, S. (1991). Promoting systematic processing in low-motivation 
settings: Effect of incongruent information on processing and judgment. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 61(1), 13-25.  
Maheswaran, D., & Sternthal, B. (1990). The effects of knowledge, motivation, and type of 
message on ad processing and product judgments. Journal of Consumer Research, 17(1), 
66-73.  
Mcintyre, S. H., & Miller, C. M. (1999). The selection and pricing of retail assortments: An 
empirical approach. Journal of Retailing, 75(3), 295.  
Mehta, R., Hoegg, J., & Chakravarti, A. (2011). Knowing too much: Expertise-induced false 
recall effects in product comparison. Journal of Consumer Research, 38(3), 535-554.  
Menon, S., & Soman, D. (2002). Managing the power of curiosity for effective web advertising 
strategies. Journal of Advertising, 31(3), 1-14.  
Moore, D. L., Hausknecht, D., & Thamodaran, K. (1986). Time compression, response 
opportunity and persuasion. Journal of Consumer Research, 13(1), 85-99.  
Moreau, C. P., Markman, A. B., & Lehmann, D. R. (2001). 'What is it?' Categorization flexibility 
and consumers' responses to really new products. Journal of Consumer Research, 27(4), 
489-498.  
 
 
75 
 
Muller, D., Judd, C. M., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2005). When moderation is mediated and mediation 
is moderated. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(6), 852-863.  
Nam, M., Wang, J., & Lee, A. Y. (2012). The difference between differences: How expertise 
affects diagnosticity of attribute alignability. Journal of Consumer Research, 39(4), 736-
750.  
Park, C. W., Gardner, M. P., & Thukral, V. K. (1988). Self-perceived knowledge: Some effects 
on information processing for a choice task. The American Journal of Psychology, 101(3), 
401.  
Park, C. W., & Lessig, V. P. (1981). Familiarity and its impact on consumer decision biases and 
heuristics. Journal of Consumer Research, 8(2), 223-230.  
Park, C. W., Mothersbaugh, D. L., & Feick, L. (1994). Consumer knowledge assessment. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 21(1), 71-82.  
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1981). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary 
approaches. Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown. 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 19, 123-205.  
Petty, R. E., Briñol, P., Loersch, C., & McCaslin, M. J. (2009). The need for cognition. In M. R. 
Leary, & R. H. Hoyle (Eds.), Handbook of individual differences in social behavior (pp. 
318-329). New York/London: The Guildford Press. 
 
 
76 
 
Radecki, C. M., & Jaccard, J. (1995). Perceptions of knowledge, actual knowledge, and 
information search behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 31(2), 107.  
Ratneshwar, S., & Chaiken, S. (1991). Comprehension's role in persuasion: The case of its 
moderating effect on the persuasive impact of source cues. Journal of Consumer Research, 
18(1), 52-62.  
Russo, J. E. (1977). The value of unit price information. Journal of Marketing Research, 14, 
193-201.  
Salganik, M., Dodds, P. S., & Watts, D. J. (2006). Experimental study of inequality and 
unpredictability in an artificial cultural market. Science, (311), 854-856.  
Salganik, M., & Watts, D. (2008). Leading the herd astray: An experimental study of self-
fulfilling prophecies in an artificial cultural market. Social Psychology Quarterly, 71(4), 
338-355.  
Sasaki, T., Becker, D. V., Janssen, M. A., & Neel, R. (2011). Does greater product information 
actually inform consumer decisions? The relationship between product information quantity 
and diversity of consumer decisions. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(3), 391-398.  
Scheibehenne, B., Greifeneder, R., & Todd, P. M. (2010). Can there ever be too many options? 
A meta-analytic review of choice overload. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(3), 409-425.  
Schwarz, N. (1998). Accessible content and accessibility experiences: The interplay of 
declarative and experiential information in judgment. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 2(2), 87-99.  
 
 
77 
 
Schwarz, N. (2004). Metacognitive experiences in consumer judgment and decision making. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14(4), 332-348.  
Sela, A., Berger, J., & Liu, W. (2009). Variety, vice, and virtue: How assortment size influences 
option choice. Journal of Consumer Research, 35(6), 941-951.  
Shah, A. K., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2008). Heuristics made easy: An effort-reduction 
framework. Psychological Bulletin, 134(2), 207-222.  
Silvia, P. J. (2008). Appraisal components and emotion traits: Examining the appraisal basis of 
trait curiosity. Cognition & Emotion, 22(1), 94-113.  
Spielberger, C. D., & Starr, L. M. (1994). Curiosity and exploratory behavior. In J. H. F. O’Neil, 
& M. Drillings (Eds.), Motivation: Theory and research (pp. 221-243). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum 
Sujan, M. (1985). Consumer knowledge: Effects on evaluation strategies mediating consumer 
judgments. Journal of Consumer Research, 12(1), 31-46.  
Tetlock, P. E. (1983). Accountability and complexity of thought. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 45(1), 74-83.  
Tucker, C., & Zhang, J. (2011). How does popularity information affect choices? A field 
experiment. Management Science, 57(5), 828-842.  
 
 
78 
 
van Dijk, E., & Zeelenberg, M. (2007). When curiosity killed regret: Avoiding or seeking the 
unknown in decision-making under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
43(4), 656-662.  
Venkatesan, M. (1966). Experimental study of consumer behavior conformity and independence. 
Journal of Marketing Research, 3(4), 384-387.  
White, T., & Schlosser, A. (2006) ,"When more is really more: Effects of innovativeness and 
product descriptions on reactions to new product assortments", in AP - Asia-Pacific 
Advances in Consumer Research Volume 7, eds. Margaret Craig Lees, Teresa Davis, and 
Gary Gregory, Sydney, Australia : Association for Consumer Research, Pages: 308-309. 
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., Reber, R., & Fazendeiro, T. A. (2003). Cognitive and affective 
consequences of visual fluency: When seeing is easy on the mind. In L.M. Scott: R. Batra 
(Ed.), Persuasive imagery: A consumer response perspective (pp. 75-89). 
Wood, W. (2000). Attitude change: Persuasion and social influence. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 51(1), 539.  
Wood, W., Kallgren, C. A., & Preisler, R. M. (1985). Access to attitude-relevant information in 
memory as a determinant of persuasion: The role of message attributes. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 21(1), 73-85.  
Wooten, D. B., & Reed II, A. (1998). Informational influence and the ambiguity of product 
experience: Order effects on the weighting of evidence. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 
7(1), 79-99.  
 
 
79 
 
Wu, C., & Shaffer, D. R. (1987). Susceptibility to persuasive appeals as a function of source 
credibility and prior experience with the attitude object. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 52(4), 677-688. 
Wyer, R. S., & Xu, A. J. (2010). The role of behavioral mind-sets in goal-directed activity: 
Conceptual underpinnings and empirical evidence. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 20(2), 
107-125.  
Xu, A. J., & Wyer Robert, S. (2010). Puffery in advertisements: The effects of media context, 
communication norms, and consumer knowledge. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(2), 
329-343.  
Yaniv, I. (2004). Receiving other people’s advice: Influence and benefit. Organizational 
Behavior & Human Decision Processes, 93(1), 1-13.  
Zhao, X., Lynch Jr, J.,G., & Chen, Q. (2010). Reconsidering baron and kenny: Myths and truths 
about mediation analysis. Journal of Consumer Research, 37(2), 197-206.  
  
  
 
 
80 
 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 1 
Small assortment without cues 
  
 
Small assortment with popularity cues 
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APPENDIX B: MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 2 
Large assortment with popularity cues 
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APPENDIX C: MATERIALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 3 
An ssortment with popularity cues 
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APPENDIX D: THE SCALES OF EPISTEMIC CURIOSITY USED IN EXPERIMENT 2 
 
 
Please read each statement and then click to indicate how you think you would felt while you 
evaluating the wine assortment. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give 
the answer which seems to best describe how you felt. 
 
1 (not at all) to 4 (very much) 
1. I thought it was fun to increase my understanding about beers 
2. I would enjoy reading more about the beers in this assortment. 
3. I would like to see more details about the beers descriptions in this assortment. 
4. It was fascinating to me to read the beer descriptions. 
5. When I read a description that puzzled me, I kept reading it until I understood it. 
6. I found myself getting tired of reading about the beers in this assortment (reversed). 
7. When I came across a beer description I did not understand, I tried to figure out its 
meaning. 
8. This display of beers stimulated me to think of the beers in the list. 
9. I felt curious about the taste of each beer. 
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APPENDIX E: KNOWLEDGE PERCEPTION MANIPULATION USED IN EXPERIMENT 3 
 
Wine knowledge manipulation questions. 
High knowledge condition 
1. To taste wine better, a person should leave the first taste of wine in his/her mouth for 3 to 
5 seconds. 
2. The color of médoc wines is red. 
3. You should probably refrain from tasting wine if you have a stuffy nose. 
4. A spoiled bottle of wine means moldy or vinegar smell. 
5. White wines should be served cold and red wines should be served at room temperature 
or slightly cold. 
Low knowledge condition 
1. Appellation means a wine-producing region defined by certain geographical features. 
2. A Shiraz is a much more full-bodied red wine than the fruity Syrah. 
3. When you see the term "Meritage" on a wine label, the wine is French and has received 
high honors. 
4. In Champagne-speak, a cuvee is the finished blend of a Champagne. 
5. Whether it is young or old is can be learned from the color of a wine. 
 
 
 
85 
 
APPENDIX F: SUMMARY OF RELEVANT RESEARCH ON EFFECTS OF PRODUCT POPULARITY 
 
Author(s) Year Context The existence of 
preexisting 
preference or 
dominating 
option(s) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Findings 
Cai et al. 2009 a choice of food items at a restaurant possible but 
controlled or 
measured 
the number 
dishes sold 
table cards naming the five most popular 
items in a restaurant boosted the 
frequency of orders of these items by as 
much as 20% 
Carare  2012 a choice of mobile applications no willingness to 
pay  
willingness to pay about $4.50 more for 
top-ranked mobile applications than for 
the same applications presented without 
ranking information  
Hung and 
Chen  
2006 a choice of book yes 
a dominating 
option 
the number of 
people who 
chose either A or 
B 
a greater sales volume leads to a higher 
preference for the option when other 
related information does not discriminate 
among the alternatives 
Salganik, 
Dodds, and 
Watts. & 
Salganik 
and Watts 
2006 
& 
2008 
a choice of a song no the number of 
downloads of a 
song 
The number of download leads to an 
increased number of downloads of an 
initially less preferred product  
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Author(s) Year Context The existence of 
preexisting 
preference or 
dominating 
option(s) 
Main dependent
variable 
Findings 
Hanson and 
Putler  
1996 a choice of computer program no the number of 
downloads of a 
file 
manipulating perceptions of the number 
of other users who had previously 
downloaded a file increased future sales 
levels 
Goldstein et 
al.  
2008 choice to participate in a towel reuse 
program at a hotel 
no the number of 
people who 
decided to reuse 
towels in a hotel 
the towel reuse rate was greater in the 
social message than in the standard 
environmental message condition (44% 
vs. 35%, respectively) 
Goodman 
et al. 
2013 choice of product (e.g., tea, energy 
bar, etc.) 
yes decision 
difficulty and the 
consideration set 
size 
product recommendations can make 
choices more difficult than without this 
information because of possible 
preference conflict 
Fitzsimons 
and 
Lehmann 
(2004 
 choice of energy bar yes the number of 
particular options 
chosen 
participants’ choices were typically 
opposed to the recommendation because 
of greater decision difficulty, lower 
decision satisfaction, and greater 
psychological reactance 
 
Yaniv 2004 Participants’ memory about  
historical events 
not applicable answers to the 
questions about 
historical events 
knowledgeable participants gave greater 
weight to their own opinions and 
discounted others’ opinions in a memory 
task; as a result, their judgments 
benefitted less from these opinions than 
less knowledgeable participants’ did 
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Author(s) Year Context The existence of 
preexisting 
preference or 
dominating 
option(s) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Findings 
Baron, 
Vandello, 
and 
Brunsman 
1996 participants along with confederates 
viewed a series of pictures for either 
1 or 10 seconds, and then responded 
to questions about them 
not applicable answers to the 
question about 
study materials 
participants based their responses on 
confederates’ (incorrect) answers only 
when (a) the pictures were presented for a 
short time and (b) they believed that their 
responses were important rather than part 
of a pilot test 
Gino and 
Moore 
2007 estimation of the weight of the person 
in a picture 
 
not applicable how much 
participants 
weighed the 
advice they 
received 
participants tend to overweight advice if a 
task is difficult and underweight it if a 
task is easy 
Mackie  1987 opinion about involvement of the US 
military in another part of the country
not applicable attitude change 
toward majority 
position 
people are more likely to adopt the 
majority’s opinion on an issue when they 
lack the necessary ability or motivation to 
process issue-relevant material 
Sasaki et al. 2011 choice of digital cameras, 
headphones, music CDs, books and 
detergents 
no product choice people’s choice of the most popular 
option is greater when the amount of 
attribute information provided is large, 
thereby exceeding their capacity to 
process it 
 
